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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD:
AN INQUIRY IN LEGAL TAXONOMY
Todd S. Aagaard
This Article examines the classification of the law into legal fields,
first generally and then by specific examination of the field of
environmental law. We classify the law into fields to find and to create
patterns, which render the law coherent and understandable. A legal field is
a group of situations unified by a pattern or set of patterns that is both
common and distinctive to the field. We can conceptualize a legal field as
the interaction of four underlying constitutive dimensions of the field: (1) a
factual context that gives rise to (2) certain policy tradeoffs, which are in
turn resolved by (3) the application of values and interests to produce
(4) legal doctrine. An organizational framework for a field identifies the
field’s common and distinctive patterns, which may arise in any of these
underlying constitutive dimensions.
The second part of the Article applies this general analytical
approach to the field of environmental law, proposing a framework for
understanding environmental law as a field of legal study. Two core factual
characteristics of environmental problems are, in combination, both
common and distinct to environmental law: physical public resources and
pervasive interrelatedness.
Numerous use demands are placed on
environmental resources, creating conflicts. These use conflicts define the
policy tradeoffs that frame environmental lawmaking, forming the basis for
a use-conflict framework for conceptualizing environmental lawmaking. A
use-conflict framework for environmental lawmaking carries significant
analytical advantages over other models for conceptualizing environmental
law as a legal field.
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What makes an area of law a legal field? What distinguishes areas
of law we regard as legal fields from the oft-cited joke of the “Law of the
Horse”?1 What do we aim to accomplish with legal taxonomy, by
classifying the law into more specific sub-disciplines? What kind of
taxonomical scheme advances those objectives? What characteristics must
an area of law exhibit to advance those aims and to establish its validity as a
legal field?
This Article addresses these questions, both generally and by
specific examination of the field of environmental law. Environmental
law’s existential angst provides fertile ground for considering questions of
legal taxonomy. There is no doubt that something we call environmental
law exists. We are in the vicinity of the fortieth anniversary of the birth of
modern environmental law in the United States.2 Over that period,
environmental law has matured considerably and has reached a certain level
of stability.3 There seems little doubt that environmental law is now a
permanent fixture in the law. On the other hand, the thrill of the
environmental legal revolution of the 1970s has long since faded, the
content of environmental law has complexified dramatically over time, and
there has arisen a marked frustration with environmental law’s incoherence.
Environmental law is bemoaned, even among its advocates, as highly
1

According to one telling of the joke, the Law of the Horse would consist of Contracting
for a Horse, Owning a Horse, Torts by a Horse, and Litigation Over a Horse. Darian M.
Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections on the
Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 71 (2008) (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Is
There a “New” New Haven School of International Law?, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 572
n.85 (2007)); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996) (“Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal
with people kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or
with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse shows.”). For additional
references to, and discussion of, the “Law of the Horse,” see Easterbrook, supra, at 207,
214 (attributing the origin of the phrase to Karl Llewellyn); Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health
Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 368 (2006); Henry
T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 40405 (2006); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999).
2
The first major federal environmental case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), was decided in 1965. The first
modern federal environmental statute, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f, was signed into law on January 1, 1970. See also RICHARD J.
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 48 (2004) (noting that 1970 saw, in
addition to signing of NEPA, the creation of the President’s Council on Environmental
Quality, the first nationwide celebration of Earth Day, the creation of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, and the passage of the Clean Air Act’s demanding and
uncompromising air pollution control program”).
3
See James L. Huffman, The Past and Future of Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23, 23
(2005).
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fragmented4 and unduly complicated.5 There is a strong sense that
environmental law needs an overall vision or descriptive framework that
works to cohere the subject matter.6
The project of attempting to identify such a unifying framework for
environmental law poses certain questions: What is environmental law?
When we describe a factual pattern, case, or rule as arising within
environmental law, what associations do we mean to convey by that
designation?
What, if anything, unifies environmental law?
Is
environmental law a legal field, or just an amalgamation of laws arranged
under a general subject matter? Does environmental law function
distinctively? What differentiates environmental law from other legal
fields?
Addressing such questions, whether in environmental law or in
some other area, is not just academic rumination. Classification is inherent
and fundamental to the operation of law. Justice requires consistency.7
Legal classifications enable consistency by designating categories of similar
situations to which a common set of principles apply. The category into
which a situation is assigned thus may determine how the law applies to the
situation.8 The law works through categories, and one of the more
4

See, e.g., Uwe M. Erling, Approaches To Integrated Pollution Control in the United
States and the European Union, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2001); Daniel A. Farber,
Foreword, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 383, 386 (2005); Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of
Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J.
661, 662 (2008); Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to
Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 29 (1998);
Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1338 n.22 (2002); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and
the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 190 (1997).
5
DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 1 (1999); Peter Manus, Our Environmental
Rebels: An Average American Law Professor's Perspective on Environmental Advocacy,
40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 516 (2006); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law in the Law
Schools: What We Teach and How We Feel About It, 19 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,251 (1989);
David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619,
621, 625 (1994).
6
See Daniel A. Farber, Foreword, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 383, 387 (2005) (“But without any
overall vision of the field, it is unclear how either agencies or courts can produce a halfway
coherent approach to environmental law.”); Westbrook, supra note 5, at 621
(“[E]nvironmental law is not a discipline, because it lacks the professional consensus on a
coherent internal organization of materials a discipline requires.”).
7
See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391
(1983); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 293-94 (1970).
8
To take just one example, important innovations during the 1970s in the legal rules that
apply to residential property leasing were justified by virtue of a reassignment of
residential leasing from the category of traditional property law to contract law. See, e.g.,
Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (rejecting
the application of “old common law doctrines” of “real property transactions” and relying
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important types of categories employed in the law are legal fields. We
designate legal fields—environmental law, labor law, criminal law—on the
premise that those designations identify something important about how the
law operates.
Thinking about what it means to designate a field of law and what is
required for an area of law to be a legal field therefore carries the promise
of improving our understanding of how the law functions. An improved
understanding of the law, in turn, may facilitate efforts to improve the law.
When we understand how the law functions, we are better able to identify
situations in which the law does not promote our desired objectives and to
posit alternative approaches that may be more effective.9 Constructing an
analytical framework that brings together an area of law as varied and
complex as environmental law will not itself resolve the recurring conflicts
and difficulties that stymie environmental lawmaking, but it may well
expose those conflicts and difficulties in a new light and help to frame the
decisions facing legislatures, agencies, and courts, thereby facilitating more
effective lawmaking.
This Article’s examination of legal taxonomy proceeds in two Parts.
Part I addresses the general question of what makes an area of law a legal
field. We classify the law into fields to find and to create patterns, which
render the law coherent and understandable. A legal field is a group of
situations unified by a pattern or set of patterns that is both common and
distinctive to the field. We can conceptualize a legal field as the interaction
of four underlying constitutive dimensions of the field: (1) a factual context
that gives rise to (2) certain policy tradeoffs, which are in turn resolved by
(3) the application of values and interests to produce (4) legal doctrine. An
organizational framework for a field identifies the field’s common and
distinctive patterns, which may arise in any of these underlying constitutive
dimensions. The more that common and distinctive features predominate
within the field, the more useful the field is likely to be as an analytical
category. In addition, ideally a legal field also has trans-substantive
implications that extend beyond the field.

on contract principles to hold that a warranty of habitability should be applied into urban
residential leases); Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 771, 773 (N.J. 1977) (rejecting the
application of “principles of property law” and relying on contract principles to hold that a
landlord has a duty to mitigate damages where it attempts to recover rent due from a
defaulting tenant).
9
Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1070 (2008) (contending that the authors’ “threedimensional view” of property law “leads to a richer and more coherent view of the field”
that can enable “scholars and lawmakers . . . to tailor better solutions to current and future
property problems”).
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Part II applies this general approach to the field of environmental
law, proposing a framework for understanding environmental law as a field
of legal study. Part II begins by examining and critiquing two prominent
prior efforts to explain environmental law as a coherent legal field.10 It
argues that these efforts ultimately fail, primarily because their frameworks
are unduly focused on environmentalism, which renders their
characterizations of environmental law incomplete, rather than on
identifying a pattern of features that are common and distinctive to
environmental law.
Part II then proceeds to set forth a superior organizational
framework for environmental law, rooted in the constitutive dimensions of
the field. It argues that environmental problems—the factual context of
environmental lawmaking—involve two core factual characteristics that are,
in combination, both common and distinct to environmental law: physical
public resources and pervasive interrelatedness. Numerous use demands
are placed on these environmental resources, creating conflicts. These use
conflicts define the policy tradeoffs that frame environmental lawmaking,
forming the basis for a use-conflict framework for conceptualizing
environmental lawmaking. These use conflicts derive from the specific
factual context of the decision at issue, however, and cannot be
meaningfully generalized into abstractions.
For this reason, the
environmental law doctrine that is produced from the resolution of
environmental use conflicts does not fit a clear, general pattern. There are
no core principles that unify all of substantive environmental law doctrine.
Despite the absence of such principles, however, the analytical framework
set forth in this Article, which emphasizes the role of use conflicts in
environmental lawmaking, and the generation of use conflicts through
competition among pervasively interrelated uses of physical public
resources, meaningfully coheres the field of environmental law.
I. WHAT MAKES AN AREA OF LAW A LEGAL FIELD?
A. Legal Taxonomy and Legal Fields
We organize the law into distinct fields as a form of legal taxonomy,
on the premise that such classification will facilitate an improved

10

A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE ENVTL.
L. 213 (2004); Westbrook, supra note 5.
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understanding of the law.11 As Emily Sherwin has observed, significant
benefits can result from a useful categorization of the law:
[O]rganization of law into categories facilitate[s] legal
analysis and communication of legal ideas. . . . [A]
comprehensive formal classification of law provides a
vocabulary and grammar that can make law more accessible
and understandable to those who must use and apply it. It
assembles legal materials in a way that allows observers to
view the law as a whole. This in turn makes it easier for
lawyers to argue effectively about the normative aspects of
law, for judges to explain their decisions, and for actors to
coordinate their activities in response to law.12

11

See Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 306 (2000) (“Putting information in context gives the researcher a
powerful tool for understanding legal information.”); Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law:
Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 5 (1997)
(“Taxonomy . . . provides the intellectual framework of the law and it makes the law’s
complexity more manageable.”); Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation: Is There a
“Field”? A Tribute to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1427, 1430-32 (2006)
(“[T]ransnational litigation has become a field because the discrete pieces can only be
understood in relation to each other and to the whole . . . .”); id. at 1431 (“The study of
transnational litigation contains interrelated elements that must be brought together in order
to understand and appreciate any one of them.”); Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously,
50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 243 (2000) (“Gaining knowledge of a subject is largely a matter
of learning how to classify the subject and its constituent elements.”); id. at 244 (“We draw
classifications in law not just for the sake of classifying but because classifying rules,
cases, and so on is a large part of what acquiring legal knowledge means.”); Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484 (2006) (contending that a
good taxonomy “is not simply an attempt to catalog existing laws,” but advances our
understanding of the area of the law and thereby “provide[s] a useful framework for its
future development”); see also GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING
THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1 (1999) (“To classify is human.”);
1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW xxxi-ii (Peter Birks, ed., 2000) (“The search for order is
indistinguishable from the search for knowledge.”). But see Roscoe Pound, Classification
of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 938 (1924) (“[W]e must renounce extravagant expectations
as to what may be accomplished through classification of law. . . . For I doubt whether a
classification is possible that will do anything more than classify.”).
12
Emily Sherwin, Legal Positivism and the Taxonomy of Private Law, in STRUCTURE AND
JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS FOR PETER BIRKS 103, 119 (Charles Rickett &
Ross Grantham, eds., 2008); see also Mattei, supra note 11, at 6 (“Taxonomy plays an
important role in transferring knowledge from one area of the law to another.”); Smith,
supra note 11, at 244 (“Classifying a particular decision . . . is a claim about the meaning of
the decision, as well as about how the decision should be applied in the future. To make
good decisions courts need to distinguish like from unlike: to understand the law scholars
need to do the same thing. When lawyers and scholars argue about how a case should be
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Not every legal categorization, however, necessarily produces such
benefits, and there are an innumerable number of theoretically available
classifications from which to choose. Any particular situation that arises in
the law potentially can be classified into numerous different categories. For
example, an injury in the workplace could be characterized as a matter of,
among other subject matter categories, labor law, employment law,
occupational safety and health law, tort law, criminal law, federal law, state
law, common law, and statutory law. Each subject matter category, in turn,
can be defined and characterized in numerous different ways—that is, there
are many possible understandings of what it means to fall within the
categories of tort law, employment law, and so forth. The initial task of the
legal taxonomer, therefore, is to find, among the immense variety of
categorizations that theoretically can be employed to classify the law, those
categorizations that yield the benefits Sherwin notes.
Classification systems operate by employing an organizational
framework to differentiate among the constituent elements being organized,
determining which elements fall within which categories. A classification
is useful when the organizational framework reflects patterns that reveal
something important to us about the materials being classified.13 If a
classification system is helpful, applying the organizational framework
differentiates among the elements in a manner that signals salient
similarities and differences, bringing some degree of coherence to an
otherwise undifferentiated mass.14
Thus, the goal of legal taxonomy is to identify significant patterns in
the law. Which patterns are significant, and therefore worthy of
identification, may depend on the specific objective of the classification.15
In general, however, we would expect a pattern to be significant and worthy
of identification if it is legally relevant—that is, if it affects the application
of the law.

decided, or about the meaning of a particular rule, they are in large part arguing about how
to classify the case or the rule.”).
13
Elhauge, supra note 1, at 370 (“[D]o we gain insights from thinking as a group about the
set of legal materials grouped under this rubric?”).
14
See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 674
(1989) (“Classification is designed to reduce the complexity of complex analysis and to
highlight similarities and differences among the objects classified.”); Kenneth R. Richards,
Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 221,
232 (2000) (“A useful taxonomy . . . inform[s] the user about the important similarities and
differences among the various items in the classification. . . . Taxonomy generally employs
an organizing principle to differentiate among the elements of the classification.”).
15
Cf. ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW, supra note 11, at xliii (“different classifications simply
answer different questions”).
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Not all classifications of the law and legal taxonomy look to
categorize the law into legal fields. West Publishing Company’s American
Digest System, for example, sorts legal issues into more than 400
alphabetically arranged topic fields.16 As to the practice, teaching, study,
and deciding of law, however, legal fields are probably the most important
classification of the law. The designation of a situation as falling within, or
outside of, a particular legal field often carries powerful associations about
how the situation should be understood and what legal rule should apply to
it.17
A field of law primarily functions as a frame of reference for
understanding the set of situations that falls within the field, and to some
extent for distinguishing situations within the field from those outside of the
field. The field’s organizational framework identifies the pattern or patterns
that it associates with the field.18 The usefulness of the field varies
depending on how well that pattern explains the various situations that the
field encompasses. This explanatory power, in turn, depends on several
factors.
First, a field’s explanatory power depends on the extent to which
situations that arise within the field exhibit a recognizable pattern. The
stronger the pattern is, the more powerful the field is as a frame of reference
for analyzing the situations it encompasses.
Second, a field’s explanatory power depends on the simplicity of the
pattern. All else equal, the simpler the pattern is, the more powerful the
field is as a means of explaining the situations it includes.
16

See WEST PUBLISHING CO., THE WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM: ALPHABETICAL LIST OF
DIGEST TOPICS 1, available at http://west.thomson.com/documentation/westlaw/wlawdoc/
wlres/keynmb06.pdf; see also Berring, supra note 11, at 309 (noting that the American
Digest System “was built on a structure of topics and key numbers that allows for the
detailed sorting of legal issues into neat categories and sub-categories” and “purports to
describe every possible legal situation that can exist”).
17
See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987) (holding that state
statute of limitations for tort actions applies to federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1981, because such actions sound in tort rather than contract); Hydro Conduit Corp. v.
Kemble, 793 P.2d 855 (N.M. 1990) (applying state statute that conferred sovereign
immunity over “actions based on contract,” and holding that an action seeking restitution
for unjust enrichment fell within the category of contract for purposes of the statute);
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920 So.2d 427, 433 (Miss. 2006) (noting that choice-oflaw rules depend on the substantive area of law into which a case falls).
18
See Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97
GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (2008) (contending that the author’s proposed framework provides a “lens”
for understanding her field of health law through “greater intellectual coherence”); see also
id. at 4 (noting the author’s objective of developing “a more holistic and integrated
conceptualization of health law”); id. at 19 (noting that the debate over the proper
framework for health law “centers on how best to capture the uniqueness and coherence of
health law”).
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Third, a field’s explanatory power depends on the extent to which
the pattern predominates within the field. That is, of the various
characteristics of the situations that arise within the field, the characteristics
exhibiting the pattern predominate over other characteristics that do not.
Where the characteristics that exhibit the pattern predominate over other
characteristics, the pattern associated with the field will carry a greater
power to explain situations within the field.
Fourth, a field’s explanatory power depends on the extent to which a
single pattern explains the various issues that arise within the field. A
framework that is helpful only in explaining certain issues that arise within
a field is less helpful than a framework that explains many different issues
within the field.
Fifth, a field’s explanatory power depends on the breadth of the
field; the scope of situations that arise within the field. The more situations
that can be viewed as arising within the field (and that exhibit the pattern
that coheres the field), the broader the field and the more powerful the field
is as a frame of reference. The perfect framework for a perfectly coherent
field, therefore, would fully explain various different issues that arise in a
vast scope of situations with a simple organizing framework.
B. The Allure, and Hazard, of Coherence
Taxonomy inevitably and inherently is, to some degree, a quest for
coherence. We employ taxonomy to identify a pattern that functionally
coheres the field of study by adding some amount of logical order,
consistency, and clarity. This is the benefit of taxonomy, and it is an
important benefit. As Ann Althouse has observed, “Finding a scheme of
coherence, a framework, really is the process of understanding. To merely
observe that the field is chaotic, arcane, or incoherent is to decline the work
of understanding. . . . [W]e must search for frameworks and coherencies as
a necessary means of thinking about the subject.”19
Coherence thus exerts a strong attractive force for the legal
profession, inducing what Theodore Ruger has called a “coherence
impulse.”20 Coherence has “dramatic potential for explanation and
illumination”21 and “promises a vision of law that is unified, predictable and

19

Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 993, 1001 (1994).
20
Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 628 (2008); see
also id. at 626 (referring to “coherence anxiety”).
21
Id. at 630; see also id. (noting that “the academic preference for elegant and sparse
theoretical coherence reflects a worthy intellectual goal of discernment and illumination”);
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rational.”22 As a result, coherent fields are easier to learn, practice, decide,
and theorize.23 Not coincidentally, the archetypal common-law fields that
the legal profession intuitively regards as ideal legal fields, and that form
the foundation for law school curricula, are often characterized by strongly
coherent, even essentialist, models.24 For newer areas of law, coherence is
perceived as a ticket to legitimacy as a legal field.25 As a result, much of
the work of legal taxonomers has been to develop frameworks that bring
coherence to an area of law. In considering the coherence of a legal field,
we can think of coherence as the strength, simplicity, and predominance of
the field’s patterns.26
Not all areas of law, however, are easily susceptible to a coherent
account; some areas are just less coherent. An area of law’s coherence
depends on, among other things, the extent to which it exhibits strong,
recognizable patterns,27 and several factors may influence the existence of
such patterns.
First, an area of law is more likely to exhibit consistency if its
factual patterns have a great deal of commonality. All else equal, the more
similar the factual circumstances of situations that arise within the area, the
more consistency we would expect in the law that governs those situations.
id. at 631 (“In this framework the cure for the malaise is the imposition of some grand
unifying theme, the discovery of which is a central test of the field.”).
22
Saiman, supra note 62, at 511; see also Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal
Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CAL. L. REV. 15, 17 (1987) (ascribing to
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s approach to studying the common law the belief that
“[a]ll of the pieces of the puzzle could be assembled into a coherent picture”); Brian
Langille & Patrick Macklem, The Political Economy of Fairness: Frank Iacobucci's
Labour Law Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 343, 343 (2007) (characterizing coherence
as “a necessary precondition to principled decision making”).
23
On the other hand, the legal profession may in some respects have an interest in
maintaining at least some inscrutability in the law. See Cisco General Counsel on State of
Technology in the Law, available at http://blogs.cisco.com/news/comments/
cisco_general_counsel_on_state_of_technology_in_the_law/ (noting that, when “law gets
standardized, it can be outsourced, co-sourced, integrated, aggregated, syndicated and
shared,” empowering clients viz. a viz. their attorneys).
24
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 11-22 (1984)
25
See Ruger, supra note 20, at 630 (noting that “the intellectual pressure to achieve
singular coherence is felt most acutely by newer fields aspiring to more established, if not
canonical, status”); see also Steven Price, Book Review: Media Law in New Zealand, 36
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 665, 665 (2005) (tying recognition of the coherence of
media law to “[t]he emergence of media law as a legitimate field of study”); Saiman, supra
note 62, at 519 (“In a variety of ways, the legitimacy of restitution [as a legal field] is
entirely bound up in the debate regarding the conceptual coherence of the proposed
analytic category.”).
26
See supra text following note 18 (identifying the strength, simplicity, and predominance
of a field’s pattern as some of the factors that determine a field’s explanatory power).
27
See supra text following note 18.
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Second, areas of law in which a single value or interest has an
influence are more likely to follow strong, recognizable patterns.
The historical development of water law in the western United
States illustrates the effect of both these factors. Water law in the western
United States developed as a relatively simple system for allocating
irrigation water to local agriculture on a first-in-time priority basis.28 Over
time, as the West developed, the factual context changed and became more
varied and complex. Development brought greater demand for water,
leading to the construction of large-scale dams and aqueduct systems to
store and deliver water.29 Development also brought a greater diversity of
uses making claims to water resources, including industrial uses and
municipal drinking water systems.30 In addition, increased environmental
consciousness led to greater recognition of so-called “in-stream uses” that
benefit the natural environment, such as fish populations.31 Together, the
diversification of the factual context and the decline of resource exploitation
as the overriding value of Western water law led to the development of new
rules and principles that have rendered it more complicated and less
coherent.
Third, centralized and well-coordinated lawmaking processes are
more likely to produce law that follows a strong pattern, and thus areas in
which law is created by such processes are more likely to exhibit strong,
recognizable patterns. For example, whether an area of law is governed
primarily by detailed legislation or by judicial decisions likely influences
the coherence of the area. In judicial lawmaking, the predominance of
reasoning from precedent creates a strong influence favoring coherence.
Judicial decisionmaking intentionally looks to cohere precedential materials
and to produce a new decision consistent with that coherent understanding
of precedent; the most fundamental path of judicial reasoning is to identify

28

See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1873, 1898 (2005); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West,
41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 770 (2001).
29
Tarlock, supra note 28, at 770.
30
See id.
31
See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in
Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 656 n.100 (2008) (“[S]ome Western states have
recognized rights in instream flows, which entitle their holders to refrain from diversion
and consumption of water, in order to protect endangered fish, wildlife and habitats, or for
recreational purposes.”); A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth
Management and Western Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 14 HASTINGS
W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 983, 994-95 (2008) (“Non-consumptive uses have long
been recognized, but these uses, such as fishery maintenance flows, were relatively minor
until the 1970s.”).
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a pattern in the law and then to follow that pattern.32 Statutory lawmaking,
on the other hand, lacks a similar coherence-favoring force. Legislatures
enact and amend different statutes in different lawmaking moments, each
associated with its own particular context and its own set of compromises
among its own set of competing interests exerting pressures on the
legislators.33 Legislators act in response to those pressures, and by contrast
face relatively little pressure to conform their decisions to prior patterns,
except perhaps to some minimal extent necessary to avoid direct conflicts
among or within statutes that would render a statute unworkable.34
32

See, e.g., Susan Etta Keller, The Rhetoric of Marriage, Achievement, and Power: An
Analysis of Judicial Opinions Considering the Treatment of Professional Degrees as
Marital Property, 21 VT. L. REV. 409, 411 (1996) (noting that courts decide cases by
“extrapolat[ing] the facts at hand into a more universal pattern, connecting the precedent
they will set to the precedent they follow”). This norm predominates even outside of the
confines of binding precedent within hierarchical court systems, as evidenced by the many
cases in which courts of one jurisdiction rely on and address decisions from other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ortega v. City of New York, 9 N.Y.3d 69, 79 (N.Y. 2007) (citing
Temple Community Hosp. v. Superior Ct., 20 976 P.2d 223, 232 (Cal. 1999), in which the
California Supreme Court declined to recognize a tort cause of action for intentional third
party spoliation of evidence); N.M. v. Lackey, 110 P.3d 512, 515 (N.M. App. 2005) (citing
Idaho v. Wixom, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Idaho 1997), and Arizona v. Richcreek, 930 P.2d
1304, 1308 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), as cases in which, the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Arizona Supreme Court, respectively, concluded on “similar facts” that police officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant). Of course this does not mean that judgemade law is entirely consistent. Different judges may read precedent differently or view
the facts differently, and thereby reach different decisions in similar cases. See, e.g., John
Burritt McArthur, The Class Action Tool in Oilfield Litigation, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 113,
148 (1996) (“Even though there is little disagreement over general [class] certification
standards, the same facts can lead to different results in different courts.”). Sometimes
judges simply disagree and decline to follow each other’s decisions. See, e.g., Philadelphia
Marine Trade Ass’n-Int’l Longshoremen's Ass’n Pension Fund v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 140,
151-52 (3d Cir. 2008) (explicitly disagreeing with, and declining to follow, Deutsch v.
Commissioner, 599 F.2d 44, 44-46 (2d Cir.1979), and Miller v. United States, 784 F.2d
728, 730-31 (6th Cir.1986) (per curiam)). But the role of precedent-based reasoning in
judicial decisionmaking nevertheless undeniably exerts an overall force that favors
coherence.
33
See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 67-124 (discussing the political history of the major
federal environmental statutes).
34
Areas of the law governed primarily by detailed administrative regulations may fall
somewhere between judge-made law and statutory law. Agencies are, like legislatures,
primarily political institutions. Like statutes, regulations are promulgated and revised in
different lawmaking moments, in different contexts that result in different compromises
among different competing interests. Moreover, because regulations derive from statutes,
which may treat similar situations quite differently, differences among statutes may require
agencies to enact regulations that approach similar problems differently under different
statutes. Administrative regulations are almost inevitably more complex than legislation,
and complexity is associated with incoherence. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity:
Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (1992) (arguing that, as
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These three factors are reasons why coherence, despite its
advantages, may not be achievable for certain areas of law. In addition,
there may be reasons why we would not prefer coherence. Coherence also
has its disadvantages.
First and most important, seeking coherence can lead to imposing a
framework that creates an appearance of coherence where coherence does
not in fact exist.35 An organizational framework that prioritizes coherence
may do so at the cost of imprecisely and inaccurately characterizing the
field, by ignoring complexity and variation. Because the law and
lawmaking processes are often complicated and messy, forged by numerous
decisionmakers acting in diverse contexts, areas of law seldom live up to
the ideal of coherence.36 Thinking of a body of law as a coherent legal field
worthy of particularized study is analogous to putting on blinders and
compared with legislation, the delegation of discretion to agencies tends to result in legal
rules that are more complex). Complexity is not necessarily congruent with incoherence,
but the two characteristics are at least highly correlated.
Other factors, however, may give agencies an incentive to adopt consistent
approaches in their regulations. Institutional or professional norms that transcend
particular statutes may lead agencies to take similar approaches to disparate statutory
situations, thereby increasing coherence. Because many of its statutes involve some form
of evaluating risks to public health and the environment, for example, EPA has adopted
guidance documents that prescribe a process for assessing carcinogenic risks that applies
throughout the agency’s activities. See Notice of Availability of the Document Entitled
Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,765 (Apr. 7, 2005).
Moreover, the standards by which courts review agency rules encourage consistency
among agency decisions. See, e.g., Westar Energy, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 473 F.3d 1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“A fundamental norm of administrative
procedure requires an agency to treat like cases alike.”); Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868,
872 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Reasoned decisionmaking requires treating like cases alike; an
agency may not casually ignore its own past decisions.”) (footnote omitted). In fact,
however, most agency rules are more a product of political negotiations among competing
interest groups than a reasoned attempt to create a coherent body of law.
35
See, e.g., Robert C. Berring, supra note 22, at 16 (noting that William Blacktone’s
Commentaries “struggled to place the common law of England into a rational narrative
structure” but that he “has been roundly excoriated by later critics for bending the data to
fit his needs”); cf. Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the
Global Restitution Party, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 107 (2008) (noting the legal
realist view that “coherent classification of legal categories is all but impossible [because
e]ach instance of adjudication presents a localized act of balancing the competing interests
that the legal system can neither fully realize nor reconcile”).
36
See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 516 (2004) (“Tasks are said to be complex when their
constitutive considerations are numerous, contradictory, ambiguous, and incommensurate.
Most legal cases that are litigated and appealed are of this nature, in that the facts can be
ambiguous, incomplete, and contradictory; different rules, values, and principles can be
invoked to support opposite conclusions; and the case at hand can be somewhat analogous
to more than one previous decision.”) (footnote omitted).
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filters; blinders to obscure situations that lie outside of the field, and filters
to obscure those aspects of situations that arise within the field but that are
not focused on by the analytical framework that characterizes the field. For
better and worse, that framework defines the universe of “thinkable
thoughts” as to the category of materials it encompasses.37 Fields of law
focus attention on a particular aspect of the law only by intentionally
obscuring other aspects.38 The quest for coherence thus is prone to breeding
essentialism and reductionism.39 For example, corrective justice accounts
of tort law, by virtue of their focus on bipolarity—the relationship between
the tortfeasor and the victim that obligates the tortfeasor directly to rectify
the victim’s injury—neglect various tort rules that do not reflect
bipolarity.40 Applying a reductionist framework to achieve coherence
necessarily oversimplifies the law, disregarding outcomes that do not match
the coherent ideal.41 Thus, as organizational frameworks yield to coherence
anxiety, they lose some of their descriptive force.
Second, chasing coherence discourages experimentation in
lawmaking. Permitting a diversity of legal approaches allows lawmaking
institutions to test various alternative approaches to a particular problem,

37

Daniel Dabney coined the phrase “universe of thinkable thoughts” to describe the way in
which “categories for classifying the law . . . become the structure of the law,” and
“thoughts that aren’t represented in the system . . . become unthinkable.” Daniel Dabney,
The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literary Warrant and West’s Key Number System,
99 L. LIBRARY J. 229, 230 (2007); see also id. at 236 (“The essence of a classification
scheme is to be a closed list of the salient ideas in the literature it serves, and when the
system, by omitting an idea, implies that the idea is not sufficiently tailored to be included,
it can be an obstacle to considering the idea.”). The phrase is probably more associated
with Robert Berring, who agrees that Dabney originated the term. See, e.g., Berring, supra
note 11, at 311 n.13.
38
Cf. BOWKER & STAR, supra note 11, at 5 (“[E]ach category valorizes some point of view
and silences another.”); id. at 44 (noting that the act of creating a classification necessarily
also entails “deciding what will be visible or invisible within the system”); Dabney, supra
note 37, at 233 (noting that a classification necessarily implies “that some aspects of the
situation are more important than others”).
39
See Ruger, supra note 20, at 629 (noting that the classical field-coherence paradigm
“favors frames of analysis that are powerfully reductionist in character, and which purport
to explain a vast array of legal materials with the use of one or a few core conceptual
building blocks”).
40
See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,
709-33 (2003).
41
See Feinman, supra note 14, at 692 (noting that, because classifications necessarily
emphasize some features and deemphasize others, doctrinal classification leads to “framing
bias,” which occurs when the classification oversimplifies differences among cases within
a category); cf. also Simon, supra note 36, at 513 (2004) (explaining “coherence-based
reasoning,” a theory of cognitive psychology “posit[ing] that the mind shuns cognitively
complex and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones”).
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seeing what works and what does not.42 When we demand coherence, we
may stifle choice. Coherent accounts of the law can become deterministic,
helping to perpetuate the patterns they identify by obscuring and
discouraging opportunities to depart from those identified patterns. If, for
example, we identify torts in terms of optimal deterrence through utilitybalancing,43 we may lose sight of its corrective justice aspects.44
Third, attempting to create coherence through internal logic in the
law may well be ineffectual. Incoherence arises from a lack of consensus
about how to approach a legal problem. As long as a consensus is lacking,
lawmaking institutions are unlikely to be able to force coherence, but
instead may merely push incoherence into other areas. For example, if
substantive doctrine within a field were to favor an outcome on which there
was not consensus, this would create pressure on other areas of legal
doctrine, such as justiciability, procedure, and remedies, to counterbalance
that effect in order to reflect the diversity of preferences as to the proper
outcome.45
The drawbacks of allowing some incoherence in a field, moreover,
can easily be overstated. An inability to be reduced to a few fundamental
principles “does not mean that [a field] lacks essential, or special, attributes
worthy of study; nor does it mean that the field lacks an identifiable
structure and architecture.”46 Indeed, incoherence is itself worthy of study.

42

See RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 163 (1985) (asserting
the benefits of allowing “diversity and competition” among federal circuit courts); Samuel
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98
YALE L.J. 679, 743 (1989) (noting that, when the Supreme Court grants certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the federal circuits, it “benefit[s] from being able to observe the
effects of the different legal regimes”); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial
Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 785-86 (1983) (“If two circuits or two states are in
conflict on a question, other circuits or other states benefit from the clash of views—the
(literally) competing alternatives. The circuits as well as the states are laboratories for
social, including judicial, experimentation . . . .”).
43
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-295 (1965).
44
See Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification
for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990).
45
See Richard H. Fallon, The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies - And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006).
46
Ruger, supra note 20, at 627; see also Elhauge, supra note 1, at 367 (2006) (contending
that a field of law does not require agreement about the contours, principles, or policy goals
of the field); Hall, supra note 60, at 356 (“All the pieces do not need to fit into a tidy whole
for [an area] to be regarded as a legitimate intellectual field, nor does [an area] have to be
organized by theory or overarching principle.”); Ruger, supra note 20, at 627 (“To say that
[a field] is messy is not the same as saying it is random; to say it is multifaceted and
difficult to center on a parsimonious internal core is not the same as saying it defies all
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Attempting to determine why the law treats apparently similar situations
differently is an important endeavor toward understanding the law. It is
only by grouping materials together in a field that incoherence becomes
identifiable and susceptible to studied examination.47
In sum, in order to function as a legal field, an area of law must
exhibit some minimum degree of coherence that legitimates it as an object
of particularized study.48 But coherence has drawbacks and pitfalls as well
as benefits.
Accordingly, we should maintain ambivalence about
prioritizing coherence in legal taxonomy, and should stay cognizant of what
a classification conceals as well as what it reveals.
C. Threshold Methodological Decisions
Choosing an organizing framework for a legal field requires certain
threshold methodological decisions.49 We must define the field—that is,
identify the scope of situations we want the field to encompass. We must
choose those aspects of the field on which we want to focus. A field of law
can be understood as arising through the interaction of four underlying
constitutive dimensions: factual context, policy tradeoffs, values and
interests, and legal doctrine. An organizational framework for a legal field
can apply to any one or combination of these constitutive dimensions.
Finally, we must decide whether to employ a descriptive or prescriptive
organizational framework. How we resolve these threshold decisions
depends in part on the characteristics of the field and in part on our own
methodological inclination or objectives.
1. Defining the Field
Considering self-consciously how to think about an area of law as a
legal field requires us first to define the category we want to encompass
with our analysis. If we are going to set out to construct an organizational
framework by which to analyze a legal field, we will need to start with
some understanding of what we think falls within the category of situations
that comprise that field. Defining the field thus differs from cohering the
abstraction and generalization.”); Silberman, supra note 11, at 1429 (arguing that “a ‘field‘
is not necessarily in need of a ‘big think’ unifying theory”).
47
See id. at 646-47 (noting that legal differences within a field facilitates comparative
analysis).
48
Silberman, supra note 11, at 1429 (arguing that an area of law “merits autonomous
treatment” when it functions as “an interconnected whole”).
49
Indeed, even if we did not make such decisions deliberately, adopting an organizational
framework for a field implicitly would decide certain threshold questions.
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field with an organizational framework, but it is the first step toward a
framework.50
The objective in delineating a legal category should be to find a
definition that is “sufficiently tailored and determinate to provide a
comprehensible description of the instances that fall within [the
category].”51 A good definition should yield a coherent concept or
concepts.52 Moreover, the concepts embodied in the definition must reflect
the concepts that are analytically helpful in understanding the field.53 Thus,
the initial task of defining the field is inherently and inextricably
intertwined with the subsequent task of constructing a common
organizational framework with which to unify the field. Although we
cannot begin our analysis without defining the field that will form the object
of our analysis, as we analyze the field and come to understand it better, we
may need to revisit our initial definition, excluding situations that were
included or including situations that initially were excluded.54
There are numerous different ways to define a legal field. A legal
field can be defined on the basis of, among other things, a substantive topic
(e.g., environmental law, labor law, tort law); an aspect of the legal process
(e.g., statutory interpretation, civil procedure, criminal procedure,
remedies); an institutional actor (e.g., administrative law, federal courts); or
a trans-substantive methodological approach (e.g., law and economics,
comparative law).

50

One could classify the law into categories based solely on the definitions of the
categories, without applying an organizational framework beyond the mere definitions.
But such an approach would untether the categories from their function, and therefore their
rationale. It is the organizational framework for each field that identifies the analytical
significance of the field as a category, the rationale for the usefulness of the field as a
classification.
51
Sherwin, supra note 12, at 110.
52
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1096, 1096 (2002)
(“Most often, theorists assess a conception by determining whether it is coherent—that is,
whether it is logical and consistent.”).
53
The task of identifying the concepts that are analytically helpful in understanding the
field is addressed infra in Part IC.
54
Cf. Mark P. Gergen, A Thoroughly Modern Theory of Restitution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 173
(2005) (contending that to make restitution a coherent field, Peter Birks “had to lop off one
of its most memorable parts--restitution to reward rescue--and do some conceptual
legerdemain to include some of its most important parts, such as the right of a joint
tortfeasor who satisfies a claim to contribution from another joint tortfeasor”) (citing PETER
BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 170-71 (2d ed. 2005)).
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2. The Dimensions of the Field
After we initially define the field that is the object of our analysis,
we must choose the aspects of the field on which we want to focus our
analysis. In thinking about that choice, it is useful to conceptualize a legal
field as the interaction among four underlying constitutive dimensions of
the field: factual context, policy tradeoffs, values and interests, and legal
doctrine.55
Every area of the law operates within a factual context; a set of
factual characteristics shared in common by situations that arise within the
field.56 These factual characteristics create certain policy tradeoffs, which
dictate the range of options available to lawmaking institutions such as
courts, legislatures, executive branch agencies, or the public. The
lawmaking institutions apply values and interests to choose among the
available options dictated by the tradeoffs. Legal doctrine—the law of the
field—arises as the product of the lawmaking institutions’ choices among
available options; that is, the application of values and interests to policy
tradeoffs. The following figure illustrates the relationship among the
underlying constitutive dimensions—factual context, policy tradeoffs,
values and interests, and legal doctrine:
Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram of Generic Legal Field

Factual Context

Policy Tradeoffs
Legal Doctrine
Values and Interests

55

Some aspects of the conceptual model of legal fields developed in this Article do not
apply well to those fields of law, such as law and economics, that are organized around
trans-substantive methodological approaches. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
56
The extent to which this factual context is exogenous to the legal system varies
considerably from field to field. Personal injuries and property damage exist regardless of
law, and so the factual context of tort law is for the most part exogenous to the legal
system. For other fields, the context is itself a creation of the law. Taxes, for example,
cannot exist independently of the law, and so the factual context of tax law is to a
considerable extent endogenous to the law. The factual context of fields such as remedies,
civil procedure, and criminal procedure, moreover, are entirely endogenous to the law, in
that the questions they address arise wholly within the law itself. See, e.g., Douglas
Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164 (2008)
(noting that the field of remedies addresses “the question of what to do about a completed
or threatened violation of law”).
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The relationship among the underlying constitutive dimensions of
the law is not just unidirectional from factual context to legal doctrine; the
relationship runs the opposite direction as well. Because the law remains
the ultimate object of our analysis, we can limit our consideration of the
constitutive dimensions of a legal field to those aspects of the dimensions
that eventually bear on the form and content of legal rules.57 Elements of
factual context thus matter if, and only if, they ultimately bear on the values
and interests that the decisionmaking institution applies to resolve questions
within the area. A factual characteristic is only relevant or significant
insofar it gives rise to a policy tradeoff that matters, and a tradeoff only
matters if the decisionmaking institution cares about it. For example, a
tradeoff between making water available for irrigating agriculture or for
sustaining aquatic wildlife is significant only insofar as the decisionmaking
institution cares to some extent about both agriculture and aquatic wildlife.
Thus, in conceptualizing a field of law, legal taxonomy should care about
factual characteristics only insofar as they affect legal doctrine, by creating
policy tradeoffs that actually limit legal choice.58
Because the interplay among the underlying constitutive dimensions
produces law, an area of law can be characterized by any or all of its
underlying dimensions. Indeed, the academic literature readily yields
illustrations of analyses that characterize legal fields based on factual
context,59 policy tradeoffs,60 values and interests,61 or legal doctrine.62
57

Cf. Sherwin, supra note 12, at 108 (“Any two factual settings are alike and unlike in an
indefinite number of ways, and the only way to determine which similarities and
differences should count is to refer to some purpose or principle that picks out certain of
them as relevant to what is being decided.”).
58
Cf. infra note 67 and accompanying text (arguing that the common features that cohere a
field must be legally relevant).
59
Cf. Feinman, supra note 14, at 679-81 (defining factual classification, for which “the
factual similarities among the situations governed by the doctrines within the system
provide both the organization and the defining criteria for the category”).
60
Elhauge, supra note 1, at 366 (2006) (contending that fields require a “common
intellectual framework” that “illuminate[s] . . . common themes.”); Mark A. Hall, The
History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
347, 356 (2006) (contending that a “legal academic sub-discipline” requires “a core
substantive focus for the field and a core set of methods of inquiry”); see also Larry
Reibstein, Leveling the Political Field, THE LAW SCHOOL: THE MAGAZINE OF THE NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Autumn 2008, at 21 (quoting Richard Pildes, one of
the founders of the field of law of democracy, describing the issues in the field as
“shar[ing] a common core around the basic questions of [the field]”).
61
Ruger, supra note 20, at 635 (noting that fields can be analyzed by reference to recurring
“primary interests,” such as the right to bodily autonomy in health law).
62
Id. at 629 (noting “the standard coherence impulse in the legal academy,” which “favors
frames of analysis that are powerfully reductionist in character, and which purport to
explain a vast array of legal materials with the use of one or a few core conceptual building
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Thus, when we attempt to characterize an area of law, it may focus
on just one of these dimensions, or on a combination of dimensions. The
patterns that cohere an area of law as a legal field may arise within any of
the dimensions. An ideal, complete analytical model of a legal field would
identify interrelated patterns across all of the dimensions of the field.
Depending on the features of the area of law, however, this ideal may not be
possible. If there is not a stable mix of values and interests that operate in
an area, there may not be a consistent set of policy tradeoffs that encompass
decisionmaking. Or, even if a stable mix of values and interests (and
therefore a consistent set of policy tradeoffs) exists, if those values and
interests are not balanced consistently, the legal rules may not have enough
consistency to yield coherent legal doctrine. In such situations, our account
of an area of law necessarily may be limited to an incomplete model that
addresses only those dimensions of the area that exhibit recognizable
patterns. Depending on the objectives of our analysis, this limitation may
be fatal to the project or insignificant, or something in between.
3. Descriptive versus Prescriptive Taxonomy
In constructing an organizational framework by which to
characterize a legal field, we also must keep in mind whether we want to
reflect the area of law from a descriptive (positive) perspective or a
prescriptive (normative) perspective.63 Descriptive taxonomy attempts to
reflect an area of the law as it currently exists or traditionally has existed,
whereas prescriptive taxonomy attempts to reflect how the taxonomer
thinks the law in the area should exist. Descriptive taxonomy tends to favor
classifications that are based on objective, observable characteristics. These
characteristics may be self-identified or self-evident from the situations
themselves, or the taxonomer or other analyst may assign the features to
situations.64 Prescriptive taxonomy tends to favor classifications that look
more to the underlying functions ascribed to such characteristics. In other
words, descriptive taxonomy attempts only to recognize patterns that
already exist, whereas prescriptive taxonomy tries to create patterns and
consistencies.
blocks”); Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law
Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487, 518 (2007) (noting that the classical scheme was
based on the identification of a “central conceptual principle underlying each area of law”);
see also Reibstein, supra note 60, at 21 (quoting Owen Fiss questioning whether the
founders of the field of “law of democracy” have identified “and ‘autonomous set of
principles’ governing election law that would properly constitute a law of democracy”).
63
Cf. Sherwin, supra note 12, at 105-06 (noting that legal taxonomies can classify either
posited legal rules, ideal legal rules, or “semi-ideal rules attributed to legal decisions”).
64
Sherwin, supra note 12, at 105-06.
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In reality, most legal taxonomies to some extent combine descriptive
and prescriptive elements. Even a prescriptive taxonomy usually reflects to
some extent the content of existing law, rather than a purely theoretical
body of perfect law. And even where a taxonomy attempts to be
descriptive, the very process of organizing an area of law based on some
characteristics and not on others often involves a normative prioritization
rather than a purely descriptive choice. Then once we have adopted an
organizing framework, that framework inevitably affects how we approach
problems that arise in the area. Indeed, because the purpose of taxonomy is
to shape the way we understand that which is being classified, thereby
affecting how we analyze and think about the area, there is inherently a
prescriptive aspect to even the most purely descriptive taxonomy. For
example, the conclusion that a particular situation has been misclassified—
for example, as a tort rather than a contract dispute—often carries with it the
consequential conclusion that the wrong rule or set of rules has been applied
to the situation.65 This is true to a greater extent than in the natural
sciences, where the taxonomer is much more just an observer. In the law,
the taxonomer is also, inherently, part of the project to shape the law as well
as to observe and to characterize it.
D. Minimum Requirements
Taking into account the considerations we have addressed, we can
turn now to identifying the characteristics that are required for an area of
law to constitute a useful classification as a legal field. At a minimum, a
legal field must exhibit two characteristics:
commonality and
distinctiveness. An organizational framework for a legal field therefore
must focus on identifying a combination of features that, as a group, are
common and distinctive to the field. To the extent that an organizational
framework focuses on features that are not shared in common within the
field and are not distinctive to the field, this calls into question the validity
and usefulness of the organizational framework, and of the legal field itself
as well.
1. Commonality
A field of law must exhibit some degree of commonality, a
characteristic or set of characteristics shared in common by the situations
that arise within the area of law the field encompasses. Commonalities
65

See, e.g., supra note 17 (citing cases in which classification as a tort or contract makes a
different as to what legal rule applies).
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establish patterns that cohere the field. These commonalities may arise
within any of the different underlying constitutive dimensions of the field:
the factual context, the policy tradeoffs, the values and interests, or the legal
doctrine.66
Moreover, not just any commonalities count. As to the first two
dimensions—factual context and policy tradeoffs—the commonalities must
be legally relevant; that is, they must make a difference in how the law
applies.67 It is only when the common characteristics are legally relevant
that the materials they encompass appear as an identifiable corpus.
Otherwise, an area of law appears to be merely an amorphous amalgamation
of portions of other, existing fields. Indeed, an area of law unified only by
factual commonality—that is, a common factual characteristic or
characteristics that make no difference to the application of the law—is like
the Law of the Horse,68 a joke rather than a legitimate field of legal study,
because the various laws that govern activities related to horses have
nothing legally important in common; the common element of the horse is
legally irrelevant.69
The presumption that a legal concept must be defined by reference
to a single definitional set of characteristics has been criticized. 70 These
critiques, in turn, call into question whether strict commonality is necessary
66

See supra Part I.C.2.
See Feinman, supra note 14, at 678 (arguing that the factual characteristics that define a
legal field should be “not arbitrary, but [should] reflect the analytical and instrumental aims
of the process,” such as “principles, policies, or interests” common to the category); Hall,
supra note 60, at 361 (arguing that the defining features of a field of law must be “central
to the analysis or inquiry, rather than . . . simply being an incident of generic law’s subject
matter”); Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 74 (contending that whether a factual attribute
defines a legitimate field of legal study depends on whether the attribute is “a legally
relevant fact.””); see also Silberman, supra note 11, at 1430 (arguing for the existence of
international litigation as a field of law “because international and comparative
perspectives shape and influence the development of rules”).
68
See supra note 1.
69
Usually the commonality is descriptive of existing law, rather than a purely normative
prescription for how one thinks the law should be. One could imagine, however, an
emerging field in which a theoretical superstructure precedes any common legal doctrine.
The field of cyberlaw definitely required the existence of cyberspace, but could have
preceded the creation of any law of cyberspace by anticipating such law and setting forth a
normative framework for thinking about it. It is more difficult to imagine a legitimate field
of existing law defined by reference to a normative framework that does not match, at least
in significant part, extant legal doctrine. At the very least, such a circumstance would seem
to require defining the field at a sufficient level of generality to encompass both the
existing doctrine and the theoretical alternative.
70
See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory,
8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2004), David Millon. Objectivity and Democracy, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 n.54 (1992); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property,
43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 779-99 (1996); Solove, supra note 52, at 1095, 1096.
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for a legal field. Scholars advancing the critique have challenged the
traditional assumption that legal concepts must be unified by a “core
common denominator”—that is, a set of necessary and sufficient
characteristics shared in common that “single out [the concept] as
unique.”71 Drawing on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, these scholars
argue that some legal concepts are unified instead by “a common pool of
similar characteristics,” analogous to “ ‘family resemblances,’ ” that forms
“ ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ ”
that defines the concept.72 This argument suggests that there may be areas
of the law that do not exhibit strict commonality as to all the features in the
organizing framework, but nevertheless share enough commonality to
cohere the area as a useful category and legal field.
2. Distinctiveness
However useful in some respects it may be to conceptualize the law
in terms of fields or categories, there are dangers from becoming too
comfortable living within categories. Taxonomy has the capacity to
obscure as well as illuminate. One potential problem with dividing the law
generally into discrete fields is that it may obscure larger principles that
transcend the particular field.73 Classifying the law into legal fields focuses
attention on particular aspects of the law by obscuring other aspects. A
framework for thinking about a field or category thus necessarily also keeps
us from not thinking about the field—that is, from seeing commonalities
across fields or categories.74 For example, an overemphasis on classifying
statutory laws into topic areas—environmental, labor, health care, tax,
etcetera—may obscure the importance of trans-substantive tools of statutory
interpretation that predominate over topic-specific interpretive methods.
For a legal field to be legitimate, there must be a good reason to focus on
the particular category; that is, some reason not to look to some broader set
of materials.
Distinctiveness—the idea that some features of the field are distinct
to the field, not present in other areas—provides just such a justification.
Thus, an area of law unified by a common, legally relevant feature (pattern)

71

Solove, supra note 52, at 1096, 1095.
Id. at 1095-97; see also Solove, supra note 11, at 486.
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See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207.
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Cf. Dabney, supra note 37, at 235 (noting that employing a classification that needlessly
separates cases from each other “has the potential at least to make the law less coherent” by
obscuring characteristics that transcend categories in the classification).
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is not a legal field unless the organizing feature is distinctive to the area.75
Distinctiveness can arise directly from unique features of the field, or from
the unique interplay of otherwise non-unique features.76
Distinctiveness in legal doctrine may mean that the field is governed
by unique legal rules that apply only within the field (field exceptionalism).
Alternatively it may mean that, although unique rules do not govern the
field, the application of general rules results in outcomes that are unique to
the field, because the field provides a factually unique context that affects
the application of particular rules, or because the field’s context results in a
unique interplay of rules.
The individual features comprising the organizational framework
that coheres a field need not necessarily each be distinctive to the field.
Rather, it is the defining features as a set that must be distinctive. There
are, for example, some features that are common to both labor law and
contract law—after all, the employer-employee relationship is
fundamentally contractual—but that does not mean that they are not each
legitimate legal fields.
Moreover, distinctiveness does not necessarily equate with
uniqueness.
Just as scholars have argued persuasively that strict
commonality may be unnecessary,77 strict uniqueness also may be
unnecessary. A legal field may exist where the field’s set of defining
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Although they have articulated the criterion in different ways, several scholars have
identified some form of distinctiveness as a requirement for a legitimate legal field. See
Carter, supra note 94, at 244 (contending that “a field becomes a field” when “concepts
and legal norms [arise] that will prevail uniquely in that context” and the field thereby
receives “some special treatment . . . in the law”); Elhauge, supra note 1, at 369 (“[D]oes
the purported field address the legal treatment of a distinct set of relations?”); Hall, supra
note 60, at 357-58 (“For a body of substantive law to emerge as a distinctive field of
intellectual inquiry, it must be more than just an assortment of rules that results from
applying other bodies of substantive law to a particular economic sector or human activity.
Such a field is not intellectually distinctive unless there are one or more attributes of the
economic or social enterprise in question that make it uniquely important or difficult in the
legal domain.”); Peter W. Hohenhaus, An Introductory Perspective on Computer Law: Is
It, Should It Be, and How Do We Best Develop It as, a Separate Discipline?, 1991 WL
330761 (April, 1991) (“The subject matter of the proposed discipline and its legal
ramifications should not comfortably or effectively fit within existing legal frameworks.”);
Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 76 (“[A] new field of legal study is justified when a
discrete factual setting generates the need for distinctive legal solutions. This
distinctiveness may manifest itself in the creation of a unique set of legal rules or legal
practices, in the unique expression or interaction of more generally applicable legal rules,
or in unique insights about law.”).
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See Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 85.
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See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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features are unified by sufficient similarity and distinctiveness—even if not
perfect uniqueness—to merit unified consideration.78
E. Additional Attribute: Transcendence
In addition to commonality and distinctiveness, Frank Easterbrook
has argued that fields of legal study also should have trans-substantive
implications—that is, that legal fields should “illuminate the entire law” and
teach “general rules.”79 Easterbrook expressed this position specifically as
an objection to the existence of cyberlaw as a legal field.80 In response to
Easterbrook’s argument, Lawrence Lessig defended the study of cyberlaw
as a legal field by arguing that the application of law to cyberspace has
yielded insights that are both distinctive and transcendent.81 On the one
hand, the distinctive features of cyberspace as a context for the application
of law yield unique insights: “We see something when we think about the
regulation of cyberspace that other areas would not show us.”82 On the
other hand, these insights are not limited to cyberlaw: they illustrate
“general concerns, not particular” and illuminate “lessons for law
generally.”83 Together, Lessig argues, this combination of distinctiveness
and transcendence “suggest[s] a reason to study cyberspace law for reasons
beyond the particulars of cyberspace.”84 Easterbrook’s and Lessig’s
comments on the benefits of transcendence highlight an additional,
potentially important characteristic of a legal field: a transcendence that
justifies studying the field in order to understand better the law in general.85
78

Cf. Feinman, supra note 14, at 699 (“The elements of different paradigms overlap, but
there is considerable redundancy among the elements of a particular paradigm; that is, most
of the elements of a paradigm are more highly correlated with elements of the same
paradigm than with elements of other paradigms.”).
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Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207. Although Eastbrook expresses a preference for
principles that apply to “the entire law,” perhaps stemming from his allegiance to a transsubstantive law and economics framework, he seems to recognize that at least some of the
general or unifying principles he seeks to illuminate may apply only in certain categories of
cases. See, e.g., id. at 208 (noting “broader rules about commercial endeavors”). His
inclination, however, is clearly toward drawing the most expansive categories possible.
80
E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 208 (arguing that, instead of developing a law of
cyberspace, we should “[d]evelop a sound law of intellectual property, then apply it to
computer networks”).
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Lessig, supra note 1, at 502-03.
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Id. at 502.
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Id. at 503; see also id. (field should “suggest a reason to study [the field] for reasons
beyond the particulars of [the field]”).
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Id. at 503.
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See also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 541 (1994) (praising academic authors who
“undertake tax-specific work that generates insights into the process of statutory
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After we have identified distinctiveness as a requisite for the validity
of a legal field, it may seem odd to look for transcendence. Distinctiveness
and transcendence may seem mutually exclusive, or at least oppositional,
but in fact their relationship is more complicated. The distinctiveness of the
field, some special combination of factors, may be what causes the field to
illuminate transcendent insights. Observing how the presence of a factual
characteristic that is unique to the field affects the development of legal
doctrine within the field may offer important insights into how the absence
of the factual characteristic in other fields affects the development of legal
doctrine in those fields.
For example, there are many similarities between the factual context
of occupational safety and health law and environmental law. In many
cases, both areas are concerned with the same types of health hazards posed
by the same types of substances.86 A crucial difference, however, is the
important role of the employer-employee contractual relationship in
occupational safety and health law, a factual element for which there is no
analog in most environmental law cases. Analyzing how the employeremployee contractual relationship affects occupational safety and health law
may well yield insights into how the absence of an analogous contractual
relationship between polluters and the public affects, or should affect, the
content of environmental law.
Unlike commonality and distinctiveness, transcendence is not
required to legitimate a field of legal study.87 If, for example, studying
environmental law helps us to understand environmental law, that suffices
to justify the study of environmental law, even if studying environmental
law does not also help us to understand law that is not environmental.88
Regardless whether the transcendence criterion is necessary, however, it is
clearly an additional benefit that enhances the value of studying the field. 89
construction generally”) (citing Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral
Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1986), and
Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991)).
86
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (regulating occupational exposure to mercury in air); 40
C.F.R. Part 61 Subpart E (regulating environmental emissions of mercury into air).
87
See Greely, supra note 1, at 405-06 (“[M]any time-honored law school subjects and legal
fields are . . . courses and fields about the law as it is applied in specific settings, not about
generalized law . . . . [A]lthough health law provides some insights that may be useful in
other areas of the law, . . . that is not crucial to its importance.”).
88
Indeed, Lessig accepts Easterbrook’s challenge to satisfy his transcendence test without
conceding that cyberspace must satisfy the test to achieve legitimacy.
89
Jay Feinman has expressed concern that the pursuit of transcendence may succeed too
well, yielding “a metaprinciple that threatens to dissipate [the particular field’s] integrity as
an independent subject and render it a mere application of some transcendent method of
analysis.” Feinman, supra note 14, at 671. Feinman’s point is analogous to the

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD

27

F. Caveats and Clarifications
Having thus proposed an approach to the characterization of a legal
field though the development of an organizational framework, several
caveats and clarifications are in order.
First, the approach set forth in this Article intentionally focuses on
the substance of the law, rather than on the processes that produce and
apply substantive law. Most conspicuously, I have omitted any attempt to
address questions of which institutions and regulatory tools are employed or
should be employed in making and implementing law, or even to analyze
how choices among institutions and regulatory tools affect the substance of
the law. For example, there may be systematic differences among the
content of legal rules produced through common law adjudication, legal
rules enacted by legislatures, and legal rules promulgated by administrative
agencies. Such questions are undoubtedly of fundamental importance, and
by excluding them I do not mean to suggest that they can be ignored.
Indeed, they cannot be completely severed from questions about the
substance of the law. It nevertheless is both possible and helpful, however,
sometimes to think about substantive law separate from these
considerations. A substantive framework, in turn, can provide a means of
evaluating alternative institutional arrangements and regulatory tools.
Second, some aspects of the conceptual model of legal fields
developed in this Part do not apply well to fields of law, such as law and
economics, that are organized around trans-substantive methodological
approaches.90 Such methodological fields have no distinctive corpus of
law, and therefore also none of the underlying constitutive dimensions we
have identified here. As a result, methodological fields cannot be unified
by an organizational framework based upon patterns in the underlying
constitutive dimensions of a particular area of law. Instead, methodological
fields are unified by a common yet distinctive methodological approach to
analyzing legal situations generally. The trans-substantive methodology
that defines the field also provides the organizational framework that
coheres it. The methodology, and not underlying constitutive dimensions,
must exhibit the minimum characteristics of commonality and
distinctiveness. By virtue of their trans-substantiveness, methodological
fields also necessarily exhibit transcendence. Methodological fields differ
aforementioned concern that that excessive pursuit of coherence may lead analyses to
overlook meaningful variations in the law. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
90
See supra text following note 54 (noting that legal fields can be organized on the basis
of, among other things, a substantive topic, an aspect of the legal process, an institutional
actor, or a trans-substantive methodological approach (e.g., law and economics,
comparative law).
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analytically in these ways from other types of legal fields, and do not
present the same organizational challenges to coherence that arise within
other fields. On the other hand, methodological fields may raise other
organizational challenges, such as determining what specific methodologies
fall within a particular methodological field.
Third, the usefulness of a field—its power to explain a set of
situations—does not depend merely on whether it meets minimum
standards of commonality and distinctiveness. Even among fields that
exhibit commonality and distinctiveness, there still may be tremendous
variation in the strength of organization of the field, as measured by the
explanatory power of the field’s organizational framework. We have seen
above that a framework’s explanatory power depends on several factors,
including the extent to which the pattern predominates within the field.91
Now we have added the additional observation that a field’s organizational
framework must focus on the field’s common and distinctive features.
Integrating these two ideas yields the proposition that a framework’s
explanatory power depends in part on the extent to which common and
distinctive features (which are part of the framework) predominate within
the field over other features (which are not part of the framework). In other
words, of the situations that arise within the field, to what extent are those
situations captured by the organizing features of the field, as opposed to
other features of the individual case that are either not shared in common in
the field or not distinctive to the field? The more that the common and
distinctive features predominate, the more coherent the field, and the more
powerful the framework that defines the field in terms of those features will
be as a tool for understanding the corpus of law encompassed by the field.
Fourth, for any particular field, there may be multiple alternative
frameworks that organize the field in a useful way. Frameworks can focus
on different dimensions of a field, or on combinations of dimensions.
Frameworks can be articulated at varying degrees of generality or
abstraction. In some cases, one framework may be clearly superior to
another in its ability to explain a field. In other cases, however, one
analytical framework will be more useful for some analyses, and another
will prove more useful for other tasks.92
Fifth, although an area of law must exhibit commonality and
distinctiveness to be a legal field, in some cases there may be benefits to
other categorizations of the law that do not meet these requirements. Even
some legal areas organized only on the basis of factual commonality may
still have some utility for some purposes. Law firms, for example, may
91

See supra text following note 15.
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form practice groups to market themselves to a particular industry—for
example, a chemical practice group staffed with lawyers familiar with
technical aspects and legal requirements of the chemical industry.93 Law
schools may teach classes addressing subject matters that attract particularly
strong student interest and use the course to illustrate cross-cutting legal
issues, rather than to study the subject matter as a distinct corpus of law.94
Such classifications may be useful for their limited purposes despite the
lack of a distinctive and coherent body of law required for a true legal field.
As Douglas Laycock’s history of remedies as a legal field95
suggests, the organization and specialization of legal practice influences the
development and recognition of legal fields. Where lawyers do not
organize themselves or specialize in terms of a particular category, this
creates a substantial impediment to the development of that category as a
legal field, even if the category has all the attributes of a legitimate field.
Laycock makes this point with respect to the field of remedies: because
practitioners do not specialize in remedies, it fell entirely on legal
academics to develop the field.96 Where, on the other hand, lawyers
organize their practice by reference to a category, this highlights the
category as a potential field, and also creates a demand for other correlates
of a legal field, such as practice materials, conferences, academic research,
and law school courses. Together, these factors are likely to spur
development and recognition of the category as a legal field.
Sixth, although the construction of a legal field may sound like a
rather orderly and logically rigorous process in which the scope of a legal
field and its internal organizing features appear clear, distinct, and welldefined, the law often is not so simple. Any particular situation may
implicate and benefit from multiple conceptual frameworks, whether
because the situation can helpfully be considered as arising within multiple
different fields, or because even within a particular field the situation can
helpfully be considered from multiple different organizing frameworks, or
both.97 This complexity is not necessarily a problem; each of the various
93

See,
e.g.,
http://www.cojk.com/ourpractice/chemicalprocesspatents.html;
http://www.mhmlaw.com/brochure/chemical.pdf.
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See W. Burlette Carter, Introduction: What Makes a “Field” a Field?, 1 VA. J. SPORTS
& L. 235 (1999) (advocating “the need for a law school curriculum that provides
opportunities for integration” of multiple legal fields and identifying sports law as a
“bridge course” that could help meet this need).
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See Laycock, supra note 56, at 167-68.
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See id.
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Some private law theorists have posited that, under a proper taxonomic system, legal
categories can be arranged in a hierarchy whereby categories at the same level of generality
do not overlap. See, e.g., Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1781 (2001) (“The test of the validity of a taxonomy is precisely the
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organizing frameworks emphasizes particular angles and insights into the
situation. That being said, to the extent that a situation arises within
multiple different fields, each of which may prescribe a different set of legal
rules, or at least different understandings of what the situation entails, field
overlap does present a challenge. For example, when the federal
government brings suit against the parent corporation of a defunct chemical
company for the costs of cleaning up industrial waste generated by the
defunct company’s chemical plant, should the issue be viewed primarily as
a question of environmental law, which would tend to emphasize broad
liability to accomplish the cleanup of environmental contamination, or
corporate law, which would emphasize the limited liability of a parent
corporation for the actions of its subsidiaries?98 Such situations of
overlapping fields “present problems for a system of doctrinal classification
at the same that they offer particularly sharp examples for the delineation of
the processes of doctrinal classification.”99
II. WHY IS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW A LEGAL FIELD?
Having addressed in Part I how we might think generally about a
field of law, Part II focuses on environmental law as a legal field. We begin
by examining two noteworthy prior efforts to cohere environmental law as a
legal field. I argue that neither of these works satisfactorily conceptualizes
environmental law as a legal field; both offer an incomplete account of the
field that is tied too closely with environmentalism. The remainder of Part
II develops my proposed framework for understanding environmental law.
My framework identifies two fundamental common and distinct factual
characteristics of environmental problems: physical public resources and
pervasive interrelatedness. Because of the multiplicity of uses that are
made of environmental resources and the pervasive interrelatedness among
these uses, conflicts among uses arise and are exceedingly difficult to
manage. These use conflicts define the policy tradeoffs that frame
environmental lawmaking, forming the basis for a use-conflict framework
for conceptualizing environmental lawmaking.

question of whether any item within its purview can appear in more than one category
purportedly pitched at the same level of generality.”); see also Feinman, supra note 14, at
664 (“Every categorization implies a choice between categories, a decision that the case
belongs in one place rather than another.”). However ill- or well-advised such a rule in the
private law context, see Sherwin, supra note 12, at 123 (expressing “doubt” about Birks’
position), for public law, such a rule seems demonstrably wrong.
98
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
99
Feinman, supra note 14, at 668.
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A. Critique of Prior Approaches
This Section examines and critiques two important prior efforts to
explain environmental law as a coherent legal field: Dan Tarlock’s 2004
article, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?,100 and David
Westbrook’s 1994 article, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence.101 Both
articles offer interesting insights into environmental law, for which they are
often cited in environmental law scholarship.102 In the end, however,
despite these contributions, neither Tarlock nor Westbrook achieves his
ultimate objective of explicating a conceptually unified environmental law.
1. Dan Tarlock’s Environmental Conceptualism
Dan Tarlock’s 2004 article, Is There a There There in
Environmental Law?,103 is probably the foremost extant work addressing
the question whether, and why, environmental law is a legal field by
attempting to develop a set of principles for environmental law. For
Tarlock, an august figure in environmental law scholarship, the project has
very real practical significance. Although Tarlock acknowledges that
“environmental law is very much embedded in the legal landscape,” and
that “[t]he legal profession never harbored any doubts about the legitimacy
of environmental law,” he nevertheless frets over “three related but
disturbing features of environmental law that make its future survival
problematic”:104
First, it is, in the span of legal time, an infant area of the law
that may not necessarily live to maturity. Second, its survival
is more problematic than other areas of law because it is not
an organic mutation of the common law, or more generally,
100

Tarlock, supra note 10.
See Westbrook, supra note 5.
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For examples of works excerpting or citing Tarlock’s article, see, e.g., DANIEL A.
FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4-8 (7th ed. 2006);
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Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24
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the western legal tradition. Third, as a result of the first two,
environmental law remains largely unintegrated into our
legal system; thus, it is vulnerable to marginalization as
support for environmentalism ebbs and flows.105
Tarlock views environmentalism as “a potentially transformative . . .
paradigm shift” in our culture that will be in danger unless and until it
becomes embedded in “a stable legal regime to reflect this meta-value
transition.”106 The construction of such a stable legal regime, he believes,
would make environmental law “real law.”107 For Tarlock, “areas of ‘real
law’” require “a set of distinctive, fundamental principles . . . that can be
applied to a wide range of current and future issues.”108 These principles
would insulate environmental law from political whims, providing “legal
drag on the amplitude of the political oscillations” and enabling
environmental law to achieve “permanence and acceptance.”109 Without
such principles, environmental law faces the possibility of “total
assimilation and marginalization” in the law generally.”110
In order to meet this perceived need, Tarlock proposes five
“candidate principles” of environmental law:
A. Minimize Uncertainty Before and As You Act
B. Environmental Degradation Should Be A Last Resort
After All Reasonable, Feasible Alternatives Have Been
Exhausted
C. Risk Can be a Legitimate Interim Basis for Prohibition of
An Activity
D. Polluters Must Continually Upgrade Waste Reduction and
Processing Technology
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Id. at 217.
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E. Environmental Decisionmaking Should Be Inclusive
Rather Than Exclusive within the Limits of Rationality111
He envisions these principles as “rebuttable presumptions” to structure
environmental decisionmaking processes, rather than “hard” substantive
rules.112
This is necessary because “the science-based nature of
environmental law precludes the definition of hard rules and pushes the law
toward process rather than consistent outcome.”113
2. David Westbrook’s Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence
Like Tarlock, David Westbrook’s 1994 article, Liberal
Environmental Jurisprudence,114 also sets out to organize environmental
law into “a coherent whole” and thereby to establish environmental law as a
legitimate discipline.115 Westbrook posits that environmental law can be
understood as a struggle to protect environmental values, which transcend
individual human welfare, within a liberal legal system that responds only
to impacts on individual humans.116
In support of his thesis, Westbrook classifies environmental law into
three stages, which together “form an idealized history that conceptually
organizes the materials of environmental law.”117 In the first stage, archaic
environmental law attempted to address environmental damage through
common law tort.118
Archaic environmental law conceptualizes
environmental harms as infringements on individual rights and seeks to
redress those infringements through traditional common law
mechanisms.119 The second stage, classical environmental law, addresses
environmental problems through bureaucratic regulation.120 Classical
environmental law strives for the ideal of an efficient market.121 It views
environmental problems as market failures, and intervenes in markets with
regulation intended to internalize the costs of environmental damage.122
The third stage, modern environmental law, addresses environmental
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problems by attempting to construct markets.123 Market incentives, both
positive (entitlements) or negative (taxes), allow market behavior to achieve
environmental objectives.124
The problem with each of these stages, as Westbrook sees it, is that
they attempt to use a liberal legal system, premised on the protection of
personal autonomy, to vindicate environmental values that do not translate
well into a liberal framework because they are not limited to protecting
personal autonomy.125 Thus, “[e]nvironmental law can be understood as a
series of attempts to phrase concern for the context of human life in a
political philosophy grounded on individual choice.”126 Because these
attempts inevitably will fail, environmental law will be complete only when
it steps outside of the liberal framework and embraces the value of nature
qua nature.127
3. Critique
Both Tarlock’s and Westbrook’s observations about environmental
law are well taken. Anyone familiar with environmental law will recognize
in Tarlock’s five candidate principles some of the recurring issues in the
field.128 And Westbrook’s account of environmental law offers important
123

Id. at 663-80.
Id. at 667.
125
Id. at 692. Westbrook is not the first scholar, of course, to note the difficulty of
protecting environmental values within a legal, social, and economic system that focuses
overwhelmingly on individual human welfare. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource
Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 295-96 (1989) (“As long as government is
making the legal rules and as long as only humans vote, the concerns of nature never will
be reflected directly in our nation’s governmental policy. Most environmental laws enacted
to date focus on protecting people’s interest in the natural environment.”). On the other
hand, the “the pervasive connections between human welfare and the surrounding
environment,” Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1505, 1549 (2008), mean that almost every environmental impact affects human welfare in
some way. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Three Economies: An Essay in Honor of Joseph
Sax, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411, 433 (1998) (“Some marketplace externalities may only affect
natural systems, with no human consequences, but many others pass through the
environment into the human welfare context of civic-societal economics.”).
126
Id. at 708; see also id. at 695 (“Environmental law can be understood as a succession of
attempts to square the circle and phrase claims of the external environment within the
internal logic of liberalism.”); id. at 701 (“The emergence of illiberal values, such as a
substantive value in nature, within the context of liberal law is thus incessantly
problematic.”).
127
Id. at 709, 711.
128
For example, a recent major Supreme Court environmental case, Environmental Defense
v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007), involved a dispute between federal regulators
and the owner of a coal-fired electricity generating plant over whether modifications the
124

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD

35

insights into some of the difficulties faced in making environmental law
through systems, institutions, and processes that are in many ways ill-suited
to a full consideration of the natural environment. But, in my assessment,
neither Tarlock nor Westbrook ultimately meet their goal of cohering
environmental law as a legal field.
Both Tarlock and Westbrook focus on conceptualizing
environmental law by reference to environmentalist ideals. Although
environmentalism obviously plays an important role in environmental
lawmaking, the centrality of environmentalism to Tarlock’s and
Westbrook’s frameworks is to their arguments’ detriment in at least two
respects.
First, to the extent that Tarlock and Westbrook intend their accounts
to describe environmental law as it exists,129 rather than some normative
ideal, their focus on environmentalism renders their characterization of
environmental law incomplete. Environmentalism does not predominate in
current environmental law, and there is little prospect of that changing
significantly in the future. Instead, environmental law reflects a balance
among a variety of competing values and interests, which include
environmentalism but also other, arguably more powerful, values such as
maintaining traditional patterns of resource exploitation and resistance to
government regulation.130 Indeed, even Tarlock’s principles, which he
proposes as tools for advancing environmentalism, acknowledge at least
implicitly that environmentalism has to be balanced against other values
and interests.131 It is that balance among competing demands on
owner made at the plant rendered the plant a new or modified source that, under the Clean
Air Act, is required to adopt more stringent pollution control technology. Duke Energy is a
clear example of a case implicating Tarlock’s fourth principle, which holds that polluters
must continually upgrade waste reduction and processing technology. Tarlock, supra note
10, at 252.
129
Tarlock is unclear about whether his principles are primarily descriptive or prescriptive.
See Tarlock, supra note 10, at 249 (describing his candidate principles as “a mix of how
environmental law has evolved and how it should evolve”). Westbrook adopts a largely
descriptive framework, which he employs at the end of his article to make prescriptive
arguments. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 621 (identifying his goal of organizing “the
basic materials of environmental law”—“the key statutes, cases, and articles that every
environmental lawyers knows and every casebook contains”—“into a coherent whole”); id.
at 711 (arguing in favor of “[a] vision of nature adequate to inform environmental
jurisprudence” that would “transform politics”).
130
See infra text accompanying note 158.
131
Thus, Tarlock’s first principle posits that environmental law should minimize
uncertainty before actions are taken, Tarlock, supra note 10, at 249—but also
acknowledges that decisions must be made despite lingering uncertainty, see id. at 249
(acknowledging that some information will be acquired “as you act,” after an initial
decision has been made). Tarlock’s second principle advocates avoiding environmental
degradation, id. at 250—but he acknowledges that “a general non-degradation standard . . .
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environmental resources, more than anything, that defines environmental
decisionmaking. Moreover, this balance is a central, inherent, and internal
part of environmental law itself, not, as both Tarlock and Westbrook seem
to assume, an external threat to environmental law. By relegating these
countervailing considerations to an ancillary role in their frameworks, and
failing to address how to balance among competing considerations,
Tarlock’s and Westbrook’s accounts of environmental law lose much of
their potential descriptive and prescriptive efficacy.
Second,
Tarlock’s
and
Westbrook’s
invocations
of
environmentalism oversimplify the variety of values and interests that can
be associated with environmental protection. Environmental protection
means different specific things in different situations and to different
people; in any given scenario, a diverse range of values and interests may
claim to fall under the general category of environmental protection:
tourism, recreation, wildlife habitat, sustainable resource extraction,
absolute preservation, and a host of others. Various combinations of these
values and interests may be relevant to a particular environmental decision.
These values and interests may conflict. Environmental protection thus is
not monolithic. By employing the broad category of environmental
protection to animate their characterization of environmental law, Tarlock
and Westbrook obscure many of the most vexing tradeoffs facing
environmental decisionmakers.
In addition to tying their frameworks for unifying environmental law
too closely to environmentalism, Tarlock and Westbrook also are
conceptually underinclusive. Tarlock confines his search for a conceptual
core of environmental law to the content of legal doctrine, not to any of the
other dimensions of environmental law: factual context, policy tradeoffs,
and values and interests.132 This probably stems in part from Tarlock’s
practical objective of promoting environmental protection through the
application of environmental law;133 to a large extent, Tarlock cares only
is not possible” and that degradation should be allowed “if there are no acceptable
alternatives,” id. Tarlock’s third principle asserts that government can regulate substances
or activities based on a risk of an adverse impact, without proving that the impact will
definitely occur—but only if the government can justify the regulation. Id. at 251-52.
Tarlock’s fourth principle provides that environmental law should continuously advance
technology—but a source that recently upgraded to the prior best available technology, at
great expense, must be exempted, at least temporarily, from further upgrades. Id. at 252.
Tarlock’s fifth and final principle advocates making decisions inclusive—except when
doing so exceeds the limits of rationality. Id. at 253.
132
See supra Part I.C.2.
133
See, e.g., id. at 228 (expressing concern that environmental law “will lose power in the
judicial and political arena”); id. at 254 (expressing his hope that environmental law will
“evolve into a permanent check on the full range of resource consumption decisions”).
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about whether environmental law accomplishes environmental protection,
and therefore only about the content of environmental law doctrine. To the
extent there is coherence in environmental law outside of environmental
law doctrine, Tarlock may simply not care, at least for the purposes of his
article.
On the other hand, Tarlock does repeatedly invoke the idea that
environmental law can or must be reduced to “a set of distinctive,
fundamental principles”134 if it is to be a legitimate legal field or “real
law.”135 In this respect, he seems to accept the conceptualist assumption
that a legal field can only exhibit coherence to the extent it can be reduced
to a few fundamental principles. Such an approach neglects coherence
arising from other dimensions of a field. Moreover, whatever the merits of
conceptualism136 as an approach in other legal fields,137 it seems poorly
matched to environmental law.
As Tarlock’s candidate principles
themselves reflect by their failure to address the tradeoffs they implicate,
environmental law lacks the level of internal logic and consistency in its
legal doctrine that would be necessary to yield conceptualist principles.138
The context of environmental law is too nuanced to yield simple principles.
This does not mean, however, as Tarlock seems to think, that environmental
law lacks a conceptual core or is not a legal field.139
Nor does Westbrook’s “limits of liberalism” theory accomplish his
goal of organizing the entirety of environmental law into “a coherent
whole.” Merely valuing nature qua nature would not, as Westbrook asserts,
render environmental law “substantively complete,”140 because the
challenges of environmental law are not limited to value-balancing. To the
contrary, the distinctive features of environmental resources, and in
particular the complex web of pervasive interrelationships among uses of
those resources, make it extremely difficult to manage the environment,

134

Id. at 218.
Id. at 218, 221, 222-23, 228.
136
“ ‘Conceptualism’ describes legal theories that place a high value on the creation (or
discovery) of a few fundamental principles and concepts at the heart of a system . . . .”
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983).
137
Cf. supra Part I.B.
138
See infra Part II.F.
139
It is interesting that Tarlock identifies, as a conceptual “model” for environmental law,
areas of natural resource law that exhibit coherence based on “the special physical
characteristics of a resource and the social dynamics that shaped the conflicts over the use
of it.” Tarlock, supra note 10, at 230. To my mind, Tarlock’s subsequent analysis of
environmental law in his article does not particularly reflect this conceptual model. The
approach to environmental law that I propose in this Article, however, strongly resembles
this conceptual model. See infra Part II.C-.F.
140
Id. at 711.
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regardless of what mix of values we are trying to vindicate.141 Thus, not
nearly every problem of environmental law derives from value-balancing,
let alone from the particular difficulties that arise from the limitations of
liberalism.
Even as to the specific focus of Westbrook’s framework, the
inability of liberalism to vindicate environmental values, his account is
incomplete. According to Westbrook, the fundamental failing of liberalism
as applied to environmental problems is that liberalism’s focus on
protecting personal autonomy prevents it from valuing the environment,
because many environmental values cannot be analyzed in terms of personal
autonomy.142
But environmentalism is not the only challenge to
liberalism’s reliance on personal autonomy. A liberal legal framework
premised on personal autonomy arguably fails in virtually every context,
because personal autonomy is not a fact but a social construct that ignores
numerous social interdependencies.143 These interdependencies include, but
are not limited to, environmental interdependence. As such, Westbrook’s
account fails to justify environmental law as a distinct legal field, instead of
just another set of instances in which interdependence exposes the fallacy of
personal autonomy on which liberalism is based.
Thus, neither Tarlock nor Westbrook achieves his objective of
finding an organizational framework to cohere environmental law as a
distinctive legal field. I have been critical of both Tarlock’s and
Westbrook’s explanations of environmental law on several points.
Ultimately, however, my most fundamental disagreement with their
approaches stems from their failure to identify what I have argued here are
the essential attributes of a legal field: a pattern of features that is common
throughout the field and distinctive to the field.144 With that critique in
mind, we can turn to my argument for a different framework for
understanding environmental law as a legal field.
B. Defining Environmental Law
In order to consider how we should think about environmental law
as a legal field, we must first have some understanding of what the field of
141

See infra Part II.C.1-.3.
Westbrook, supra note 5, at 92.
143
See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (2003); David R. Carlin, Jr., The Crusoe Fallacy: Illusion of Personal
Autonomy, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 14, 1997; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (1984).
144
Cf. Hunter, supra note 18, at 20 (criticizing other frameworks proposed for health law
on the ground that they “omit[] too much of what constitutes the core of health law”).
142
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environmental law might encompass, of the scope of situations we wish to
characterize with our organizational framework. Although everyone
probably has some intuitive sense of the meaning of the term environmental
law, it is not self-defining. Some laws—for example, pollution statutes like
the Clean Water Act145 and Clean Air Act146—obviously fall within the
definition. But what about laws governing natural resources, such as the
statutes governing management of public lands?147 These laws reflect a
consideration of the need to conserve and to preserve elements of the
natural environment, but they also intentionally facilitate the exploitation of
natural resources, even at the cost of some environmental degradation. Are
such laws environmental? What about laws that do not necessarily reflect
any consideration of the environment, yet may have significant
environmental effects—for example, tax subsidies that encourage the
purchase of sport utility vehicles with low fuel efficiencies or laws
regulating rail freight rates?148 Some statutes exhibit an obvious overall
orientation toward protecting the environment, yet include specific
provisions that do not share this goal, and in fact may be intended to
sacrifice environmental protection to satisfy some other, opposing
interest.149 Other statutes do not exhibit an overall orientation toward
protecting the environment, but include specific provisions that do reflect a
goal of environmental protection.150 Which of these are environmental law
and which are not? In order to answer that question, we first must decide
what we mean to accomplish by classifying a legal rule as environmental.
For this Article, I am interested in how the legal classification
environmental law illuminates the functioning of the law.151 In other words,
my focus is on legal rules that are environmental in a way that somehow
affects the substance of the rule or of its applications.
145

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
147
See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785.
148
See I.R.C. § 280F (allowing greater tax deduction for sport utility vehicles than for
other cars); id. § 4064 (applying an excise tax to domestic sales of cars that do not satisfy
fuel economy standards, but exempting cars that weigh more than 6000 pounds); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669
(1973) (reviewing environmental group’s challenge to Interstate Commerce Commission’s
approval of rail freight increases).
149
See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 125, 42 U.S.C. § 7425 (authorizing rules or orders prohibiting
certain air pollution sources “from using fuels other than locally or regionally available
coal or coal derivatives”).
150
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2378 (requiring military procurement of copier paper to contain
specified percentages of post-consumer recycled content); Pub. L. No. 106-181, Title I,
§ 157, 114 Stat. 89 (2000) (directing the Federal Aviation Administration to study the use
of recycled materials in pavement used for runways, taxiways, and aprons).
151
See infra Part II.A.
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A surprising amount of scholarship discusses and theorizes about
environmental law without defining the scope of the term. Some authors,
however, have offered definitions, which fall into three main types. The
most expansive definitions include all laws that affect the physical
environment.152 Other definitions restrict environmental law to laws that
are enacted for the purpose, or the primary purpose, of protecting the natural
environment.153 The narrowest definitions include only laws that reflect an
environmentalist ethic.154
In choosing a useful definition for environmental law, the challenge
is to balance overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. An overinclusive
definition risks depriving the term of meaning. Employed expansively,
environmental “may seem uselessly broad, describing nothing in
particular.” 155 If environmental law includes all laws that affect the natural
environment, then virtually every law could fall within the definition,
because almost every law affects human behavior, and almost every human
behavior affects the natural environment in some respect.156
An
152

See Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
63, 64 n.2 (2003) (“I use the term environmental law to describe the vast realm of law,
largely statutory, that addresses human actions affecting the rest of the natural world.”);
Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. ENVTL.
L.J. 211, 262 (2002-2003) (“Environmental law can be generally defined as the law
governing the relationships of humans to the biophysical environment.”).
153
See U.S.-Can.-Mex. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept.
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, art. 45.2(a) (defining “environmental law” as any statute or
regulation “the primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the
prevention of danger to human life or health”); CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2d ed. 2007) (“Environmental Law is law designed
to protect the environment, and the plants and animals that rely on it, including us.”);
Michael C. Blumm, Studying Environmental Law: A Brief Overview and Readings for a
Seminar, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 309, 310 (1992) (“Environmental
law is a loose amalgam of common law and (increasingly) statutory provisions designed to
protect public health, ecosystems, and dependent and plant species.”); LAZARUS, supra
note 2, at 1 (“[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in order to limit ecological
impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity.”).
154
See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 19 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 575, 576 (2002) (defining environmental law as “the positive and common
law that reflects environmentalism,” which Tarlock in turn defines as “an emerging
philosophy or value system which posits that we living humans should assume sciencebased ethical stewardship obligations to conserve natural systems for ourselves as well as
for future generations”) (footnotes omitted).
155
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 5 (3d ed. 2004); see also Tarlock, supra note 10, at 221 (“[T]he term
‘environmental’ has become so all-encompassing that it has been robbed of any operative
meaning; it needs contours.”).
156
See Kim Diana Connolly, The Ecology of Breastfeeding, 13 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J.
157, 157, 164 (2008) (arguing that “laws that support breastfeeding should be considered
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overinclusive definition also diverges from common understandings of the
term environmental law. Definitions generally should match common
usage.157 A definition of environmental law that includes laws that may
affect the natural environment, but that were enacted without any conscious
consideration of the environment—for example, the aforementioned tax
subsidies that encourage the purchase of sport utility vehicles with low fuel
efficiencies—would diverge from what most people understand
environmental law to entail, and likely thereby would lead to confusion.
Moreover, such laws raise a different set of issues than laws that
consciously consider the environment. For laws enacted without any
conscious consideration of the environment, the primary issue from an
environmental law perspective is the threshold question whether the
environment should factor into the lawmaking institutions’ considerations.
For laws that reflect a conscious consideration of the environment, the
question is quite different, albeit not unrelated: how does the environment
factor into the lawmaking institutions’ considerations? This leads to a set of
follow-up questions—such as what are the relevant policy tradeoffs, what
values and interests do the lawmaking institutions bring to bear to resolve
those tradeoffs, and what legal doctrine is produced as a result of those
choices—that never arise with environmental laws that do not reflect
consideration of the environment. This fundamental difference between the
two categories suggests the usefulness of a classification that distinguishes
between them instead of lumping them together.
Narrowing the definition of environmental law to include only laws
that focus primarily on protecting the environment or that reflect an
environmentalist ethic, on the other hand, ignores a crucially important
feature of environmental law: the inherent and pervasive tradeoffs in
environmental decisionmaking.158
As a result of these tradeoffs,
environmental protection is almost never the only or overriding purpose of a
law that applies to the environment. Indeed, environmental law is better
understood as a field in which the goal of environmental protection sits in a
position of constant tension with countervailing interests and values.
Environmental laws always reflect a balance of objectives, and envisioning
environmental law as exclusively or primarily devoted to environmental
protection would counterproductively obscure the essential question of how
environmental laws” because such law reduce “the negative environmental impacts of
production and distribution of artificial baby milk”)
157
See Solove, supra note 52, at 1096 (noting that theorists attempting to define privacy
will “examine whether a conception of privacy includes the things we view as private and
excludes the things we do not”); see also id. (“A few things might be left out, but the aim is
to establish a conception that encompasses most of things that are commonly viewed under
the rubric of ‘privacy.’ ”).
158
See infra Part II.C.
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to balance among competing goals and interests that include, but are not
limited to, environmental protection.
The best approach to defining environmental law—the approach that
appropriately balances overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness—
encompasses laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts on the
natural environment. This definition is not limited to laws enacted for the
primary purpose of protecting the environment, but also does not include
laws that unintentionally affect the environment. Thus, for example, natural
resource laws that prescribe both conservation and exploitation should be
considered environmental laws, whereas tax subsidies that encourage the
purchase of sport utility vehicles with low fuel efficiencies should not be
considered environmental laws. Defining environmental law to encompass
laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts on the natural
environment will allow us to study the various approaches that lawmaking
institutions take to environmental management.159
159

This definition is not, however, unproblematic. In particular, it fails to illuminate fully
another core characteristic of environmental problems: the pervasiveness of the
relationship between human activities and the natural environment. The allocation of
government spending between mass transit and roadways, for example, may significantly
affect whether individuals decide to take mass transit or drive, with concomitant effects on
the environment. But transportation funding legislation, unless enacted in part to address
environmental impacts, would generally not be considered part of environmental law.
Some provisions of federal pollution statutes, on the other hand, may have little if any real
environmental impact. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 513, 33 U.S.C. § 1372 (setting forth
labor standards for laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors
working on water treatment works funded by Clean Water Act grants). If we are to use the
category of environmental law to think critically about the relationship between law and
the environment, we need to examine that relationship both where it is intentional and
where it is unintentional. To include every minor provision of the Clean Water Act within
the definition of environmental law, but to exclude laws not aimed at the environment but
which may have far greater environmental impacts, somewhat misallocates our attention.
Excluding laws that have inadvertent environmental impacts from the definition of
environmental law creates a problematic divide between the study of environmental
problems and environmental law.
Rather than expanding the definition of environmental law to include all laws that
are relevant to the physical environment, which would implicate the aforementioned
drawbacks of overinclusiveness, an additional supplementary category can be employed to
describe laws that significantly affect the environment but that do not reflect a conscious
consideration of environmental impacts: indirect environmental law or unintentional
environmental law. Although laws that reflect a conscious consideration of human impacts
on the environment always will form the core of environmental law practice, teaching, and
scholarship, unintentional environmental law merits greater attention than it usually
receives from environmental lawyers, teachers, and scholars. See, e.g., MICHAEL
SHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM: GLOBAL
WARMING POLITICS IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD 20 (2004) (noting that David
Brower advocated “the need for the environmental community to invest more energy in
changing the tax code”). Excluding indirect environmental law from the category of
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C. Factual Context
Having defined what environmental law encompasses, we can turn
to constructing an organizational framework that coheres environmental law
as a field. Because my objective is to find an understanding of how
environmental law functions, my approach will be primarily descriptive
rather than prescriptive. To construct our organizational framework, we
will address each of the underlying constitutive dimensions of
environmental law—factual context, policy tradeoffs, values and interests,
and legal doctrine—beginning with factual context. Our goal, as Part I
established, is to identify core characteristics of environmental problems
that, in combination, are both common and distinct to environmental law. I
propose two such characteristics: (1) physical public resources; and (2)
pervasive interrelatedness. From these two core characteristics follow other
characteristics that also are important to the factual context of
environmental law: temporal and spatial disjunction, and the cruciality yet
unattainability of detailed scientific information. Moreover, these core
characteristics help to explain the recurring tradeoffs that arise in
environmental law.
1. Physical Public Resources
Environmental problems involve a physical resource that is in
important senses publicly rather than privately valued, owned, and/or
controlled. Public lands, including but not limited to lands designated for
preservation, are an obvious example of such a resource. The government
holds title to the lands and controls the use of the lands on behalf of the
public.160 Public lands also often are associated with public values, such as
a collective desire for open space, although they also may have value for
individual uses as well. Air, water, and wildlife are other examples of
environmental physical public resources. Although ownership may be less
clear than with public lands, they are not wholly privately owned and
controlled.161 More abstractly, environmental values such as picturesque
environmental law hinders the insight that many indirect environmental laws should be
direct environmental laws—that is, where environmental effects of a law are significant,
they arguably should be managed consciously.
160
See Adell Louise Amos, The Use of State Instream Flow Laws for Federal Lands:
Respecting State Control While Meeting Federal Purposes, 36 ENVTL. L. 1237, 1280
(2006) (“[F]ederal public lands are managed and the waters are protected for the benefit of
the public.”); see also generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
161
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946) (declining to recognize private property rights to airspace); Michael C. Blumm
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views and biodiversity resemble public resources with a physical
component. They arise as a collective result of individual action, and are
enjoyed collectively by the public as well.
The interrelationship among uses of public resources, and the
special difficulties with attempting to regulate conflicts among uses in the
environmental context, lie at the heart of all problems that arise in
environmental law.162 Wanting clean air or wanting to burn coal to generate
electricity are not themselves environmental problems; the problem is when
those uses conflict, when some people want clean air and others (or even
the same people) want to pollute the air to generate electricity.163
Some of the difficulties with addressing use conflicts in
environmental law are not distinct to the environmental context, but rather
arise in many common-resource situations.
Public resources pose
difficulties in a society like ours organized around an economic system
based on markets and private property and around a political and legal
system based on individual rights. When individuals have unregulated
access to public resources, they tend to overuse them, because each
individual user enjoys the full benefits of her use, whereas the costs of her
use are shared among everyone who uses or benefits from, or could use or
benefit from, the resource.164 Management of public resources therefore
requires collective action among or on behalf of the users and beneficiaries
to limit use of the resource to optimal levels.165 The difficulties of
instituting collective action have been widely noted.166 Individual users

& Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as
Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 352-53 (2005); Dave Owen,
Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall of CalFed, 37 ENVTL. L.
1145, 1179 (2007) (noting that, “water rights users may own usufructuary rights, but the
state owns the water and watercourses, and holds the latter as trustee for its people”)
(footnotes omitted) [find wildlife cite].
162
I intentionally elide here any distinction between use and non-use valuation of
environmental resources. In particular, I employ the term “use” expansively, to include
values such as preservation that do not necessarily involve any physical presence or
involvement at the resource in question. For example, I would count an appreciation of the
existence of wildlands in their pristine condition as a use of the wildlands.
163
Cf. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960).
164
See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30
ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000). Economists refer to this effect as a negative externality
(because the individual does not face the full costs of his or her action) or the tragedy of the
commons (referring to the incentive to overuse public resources).
165
See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
574-75 (2001).
166
See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971);
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must be convinced of their interest in the public resource and of the need for
management to limit its use.167 The greater the number and variation in
users, the greater the difficulty of attempting to organize them into
collective action.168 Organizing requires a leader who is willing to “bear the
costs of organization and focus the attention of a diffuse, disconnected
collection of individuals.”169 Individual users of the public resource, who
continue to have a strong incentive to free ride on the efforts of others, are
likely to resist efforts to limit their use of a public resource, even if they
recognize the need for limits on overall use.170
In addition to these standard difficulties of instituting collective
action to regulate a common resource, several characteristics of
environmental public resources make them particularly difficult to manage
or to regulate collectively. First, the environment, in its many forms, is
traditionally an unregulated public resource, often associated with long
traditions and customs of relatively uninhibited exploitation and open
access.171 Users perceive these traditions and customs as conferring an
entitlement and accordingly often strongly resist efforts to limit their uses of

ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990).
167
See Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 770
(2008) (“Similarly situated citizens may act in disparate ways that collectively lead to the
least preferred outcome, because they do not see, or at least do not prioritize, the
commonalities among them. They may fall victim to preference cycling in which even
those with similar preferences may struggle to achieve lasting agreement.”).
168
See Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515,
527 (2007); George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories
of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI. 359, 360-62 (1974).
169
Kang, supra note 167, at 770; see also HARDIN, supra note 166, at 35-37 (noting the
need for political entrepreneurs “who, for their own career reasons, find it in their private
interest to work to provide collective benefits to relevant groups”).
170
See Ostrom, supra note 166, at 36; Stigler, supra note 168. Dan Kahan has criticized
some of the precepts of collective action literature, arguing that empirical social science
shows that, “[i]n collective-action settings, individuals adopt not a materially calculating
posture but rather a richer, more emotionally nuanced reciprocal one.” Dan M. Kahan, The
Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003).
According to Kahan, individuals will willingly contribute to collective action when they
trust that others “will voluntarily respond in kind.” Id. at 72. As applied to public
resources that are widely used in relative anonymity, however, the results of Kahan’s
framework do not necessarily diverge from the results of conventional public choice
analysis. In particular, where the users are numerous and varied, and can free ride in
relative anonymity, building the requisite trust among users is likely to be difficult.
171
Cf. Peter Manus, Our Environmental Rebels: An Average American Law Professor’s
Perspective on Environmental Advocacy and the Law, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 518
(2006) (“The American jural system is based on a fundamental presumption that people
bear no moral duties to refrain from exploiting the environment . . . .”).
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the environment.172 Second, environmental public resources often have
extremely numerous, valuable, and varied uses, which increases the
probability and intractability of conflicts among users and decreases the
likelihood of effective collective action. Third, the numerousness of users
and the often complex lines of causation that create interrelationships
among uses mean that, when conflicts among uses arise, it can be
exceedingly difficult or impossible for any user harmed by the conflict to
trace her harm to any particular other user or beneficiary.173 Fourth, the
same factors—numerous users and complex causation—make it relatively
easy for users to ignore, or not to recognize, their causal role in affecting
another use. Fifth, the objectives of regulating the environment are often
difficult to evaluate, because they are not valued either economically as the
subject of traditional market transactions or politically as the subject of
traditional individual rights.174 This is especially true where, as is often the
case, environmental harms are difficult to perceive and to measure and
where the benefits associated with protecting the environment involve
existence value rather than use value, or (even more so) intrinsic value
independent of utility or tangible benefit to humans.
As an illustration of some of these difficulties, take the example of
waterways such as rivers or lakes. Waterways are subject to many and
varied uses, including public water system sources, irrigation sources,
pollution sinks, navigation, flood control, recreation, and aesthetic pleasure.
For many major waterways, thousands or millions of individuals and
businesses partake in or benefit from one or more of these uses. Potential
conflicts among the uses, and among prospective users of the same use, are
obvious. Polluted waterways are more difficult to use for safe drinking
172

See, e.g., Ray Rasker, Wilderness for Its Own Sake or as Economic Asset?, 25 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15, 15 (2005) (“[I]n the remote corners of the rural West, with a
long history of dependence on public lands for mining, energy development and logging,
the idea of setting aside land for conservation is seen as a direct affront to the well-being of
local residents.”); see also Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 281 (1987)
(“Strong initial views are resistant to change because they influence the way that
subsequent information is interpreted.”).
173
See LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 33 (“due to the highly interrelated nature of the
ecosystem, it is almost always a mistake to suppose that one can isolate a single discrete
cause as the source of an environmental problem”); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s
Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703,
747 (2000) (“[E]nvironmental harms are more typically the cumulative and synergistic
result of multiple actions, often spread over significant time and space. This is primarily
traceable to the sharing inherent in any common natural resource base, which is the object
of so many simultaneous and sporadic actions over time and space.”).
174
Cf. Lazarus, supra note 173, at 747 (“Many of the ecological injuries resulting from
environmental degradation are not readily susceptible to monetary valuation and have a
distinctively nonhuman character.”).
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water and less desirable for recreation; and water used for irrigation is
unavailable for other uses. The canoeist whose enjoyment of the waterway
is impaired by the stench emanating from its polluted waters, however, may
find it difficult to attribute that harm to any particular pollution source. But
the difficulties of the sole canoeist pale in comparison to those of a
regulator faced with an overwhelming number of desired uses of a resource,
connected by a complex web of interrelationships that create a dizzying
array of conflicts and synergies.
2. Pervasive Interrelatedness
Everything in the environment, including humans, is part of a
pervasively interrelated ecological system.175
This pervasive
interrelatedness sometimes is referred to as the First Law of Ecology.176
The media of these interrelationships frequently are the physical public
resources that comprise the environment—for example, a river that carries
nitrates from the fertilizers a farmer applies to his fields downstream to a
tadpole that experiences developmental deformities from nitrate exposure.
The interrelatedness creates connections that can cross great physical
distance and time. Air pollutants emitted into the air in Asia drift across the
Pacific Ocean to California.177 Smoking and asbestos exposure have a
synergistic interaction, resulting in a greater risk of lung cancer than what
can be attributed to the separate effects of smoking and asbestos.178
175

See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and ‘Fine-Tuning’ Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1273
(1985); Kelly Nolen, Residents at Risk: Wildlife and the Bureau of Land Management's
Planning Process, 26 ENVTL. L. 771, 779 (1996) (“Animals and plants within an ecosystem
are intricately interrelated, and the decline of any one species may have serious effects on
the balance of the entire system, with unexpected consequences for humans.”).
176
See, e.g., BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY
33-38 (1971); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Political Ecosystem--Coping
with the Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 480 n.77 (2002); see also
PLATER ET AL., supra note 155, at 5 (“The environmental perspective . . . starts from the
premise of interconnectedness--that all human enterprises exist within one vast shared
common context in which actions have collateral consequences that are relevant and should
be considered.”); see also id. at xxx (“As the First Law of Ecology says, everything is
connected to everything else.”); id. at 5 (“the environmental perspective conceptualizes all
human enterprises existing within one large system of interconnected systems”).
177
See Andrew Jacobs, U.N. Reports Pollution Threat in Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008.
178
See Thomas C. Erren et al., Synergy Between Asbestos and Smoking on Lung Cancer
Risks, 10 EPIDEMIOLOGY 405 (1999); see also Jun Peng, Iron and Paraquat as Synergistic
Environmental Risk Factors in Sporadic Parkinson’s Disease Accelerate Age-Related
Neurodegeneration, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 6914 (2007) (reporting findings suggesting that
increased oral intake of iron in the neonatal period and environmental exposure to the
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Organochlorine compounds accumulate in animal lipid tissue over time,
affecting development and reproduction.179
The pervasive interrelatedness among elements of the environment
makes the environment a highly complex system that often is exceedingly
difficult to manage. As we have seen, the objective of environmental law is
to resolve conflicts among uses.
The complexity and pervasive
interrelatedness of the environment, however, make it extremely difficult to
decide which activities need to be regulated to what extent in order to
achieve a desired balance. Any particular impact on a use of a resource
may arise from numerous, difficult-to-identify causal events. Conversely,
every event may contribute to numerous, difficult-to-identify impacts.
Pervasive interrelatedness thus contributes to the extraordinarily complex
lines of causation that often characterize environmental problems. It may
be difficult or impossible to determine with any precision a particular
action’s innumerable causes and effects that ripple throughout the
environment. Not surprisingly, unintended consequences are a recurring
phenomenon in environmental law.180
pesticide paraquat have a synergistic effect on increasing the risk of neurodegeneration
associated with Parkinson’s disease).
179
See Karen A. Glennemeier & Linda J. Begnoche, Impact of Organochlorine
Contamination on Amphibian Populations in Southwestern Michigan, 36 J. HERPETOLOGY
233, 233 (2002).
180
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Marketing Biodiversity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 421, 425 (2002)
(noting that domestic environmental regulation of industry may export environmental
degradation to other countries); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen:
The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 814
(2003) (noting the problem of “media-shifting,” in which “pollution-control laws
protecting one environmental medium (for example, air, water, or land) . . . generat[e] . . .
pollution in alternative media”); Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the Future
of Environmental Assessment: Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of Unintended
Consequences, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 981, 984 (2006) (noting that, when “Virginia resource
managers attempted to protect intertidal wetlands by establishing a development-free
jurisdictional boundary . . . landowners then built all the way to the legal side of the line,
. . . [which] inadvertently doomed the protected wetlands by disconnecting them from the
natural shoreline systems that sustain them during such periods of sea-level rise” and
thereby “accomplished the exact opposite of what policymakers had hoped for.”); David
Sunding & David Zilberman, Consideration of Economics under California's PorterCologne Act, 13 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73, 96 (2007) (“Water quality
regulation that aims to improve environmental quality can have unintended consequences
that harm the environment and natural resources. The reallocation of water from one
location to another, to meet water quality regulation, may reduce the well-being of fish and
wildlife dependent on the water in the source region. Reduction of use of chemical
pesticides that reduce farm productivity may lead to an increase in utilized land and
expansion of the utilized land base to wilderness areas. Diversion of water resources to
meet environmental quality objectives may reduce the capacity to utilize this water in
provision of environmental amenities.”).
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3. Secondary Characteristics
The core characteristics of environmental problems—physical
public resources and pervasive interrelatedness—give rise to other,
secondary characteristics that also are important for understanding
environmental law.
Temporal and Spatial Disjunctions. The pervasive interrelatedness
among elements of the environment create complex lines of causation that
often span considerable distance and time. These effects can lead to
temporal and spatial disjunctions that are important to environmental
decisionmaking. Common examples of such disjunction include the
discharge-exposure disjunction, wherein a pollutant discharged into the
environment may travel a great distance and/or over a long time before
exposing a person, animal, or plant. Polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”),
for example, which are highly toxic synthetic organic chemicals
manufactured in the United States from 1929 until 1977, do not readily
break down in the environment and therefore can persist for years, carried
throughout the globe in a series of cycles of volatilization into the
atmosphere and then redeposition to the surface.181 Another example of a
disjunction is an exposure-effect disjunction, wherein an adverse health
effect may not manifest itself for months, years, or even decades after a
person is exposed to an environmental hazard.182 Individuals exposed to
asbestos, for example, may not contract mesothelioma for 20 to 50 years
after their exposure.183 A cost-benefit disjunction arises where, as is often
true, the benefits for a use of the environment are experienced immediately
but the costs are not experienced until much later.184
These disjunctions create difficulties for environmental lawmaking.
Environmental effects manifest themselves over a much broader expanse of
space and time than human thought and institutions typically consider in
their decisionmaking; it is in many respects still unclear whether humans

181

See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE
FOR POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS 1-3, 479, 481 (2000).
182

See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1237 (2002) (“the injuries to human health
and the environment of particular substances may take years to manifest themselves”).
183
See A. Chovil & C. Stewart, Latency Period for Mesothelioma, 314 LANCET 853
(1979).
184
See Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational
Distributive Justice And Efficiency, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 79, 110 n.63 (noting that “greater
use of natural resources or degradation of the environment [sometimes] produces
immediate benefits but long-term costs”).
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have the capacity to understand and plan over the area and time that are
required for effective environmental lawmaking.185
Scientific Uncertainty. Numerous scientific questions underlie any
environmental problem. The standard approach to regulation calls for
regulating an activity in order to reduce or to avoid the harm that it can
cause.186 For environmental problems, the link between a harm and its
cause(s) runs through the medium of an ecological system comprised of a
complex web of pervasively interrelated constituent elements. The
pervasive interrelatedness among components of the natural environment
and the temporal and spatial disjunction between the causes and effects of
environmental disruption are extremely complicating factors that make
environmental effects much more difficult to predict, or even to ascertain
retrospectively. 187 Often these questions are at the frontiers of science,
arising in areas in which we have little empirical data and little
understanding of the natural interactions and processes. Policymakers look
to science to untangle that web, but there is never complete scientific
information. The combined cruciality and inevitability of scientific
uncertainty creates a circumstance in which a thorough understanding of
environmental problems is both highly important and yet wholly
unattainable. As a result, environmental law requires decisionmaking in a
context of great scientific uncertainty.188
185

See Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of
Environmental Law, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 239 (2005) (“The need for environmental law
can be seen as arising from the persistent gap between the spatial and temporal horizons of
human nature and the much wider and longer spatial and temporal dimensions of the
consequences of human activities because of the laws of nature.”); see also Holly
Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 295, 318-19
(2003) (identifying the durability-flexibility dilemma: because environmental problems
often develop over extended periods of time, environmental policies “must be durable over
unusually long periods of time” yet also must be “flexible enough to respond to new
information and changing conditions”).
186
See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands III: Regulation of Solid
and Hazardous Waste Management, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 54 (1994) (“Obviously, the
purpose of most environmental regulation is to prevent environmental harm and adverse
effects on human health.”).
187
See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 185, at 240 (“the further that the laws of nature spread
cause and effect out over time and space, the more scientific uncertainty there will be
regarding whether the adverse environmental effects projected in the future will in fact ever
happen and whether the adverse environmental effects perceived today were in fact caused
by specific activities in distant locations and times.”).
188
See Doremus, supra note 185, at 318-19; Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges Over
Troubled Waters: Eco-Pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV.
851, 855 (2003); Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the
Institutional Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 196
(2008); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
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4. Other Characteristics
I am not the first to identify fundamental characteristics of
environmental law. For example, Richard Lazarus has argued that the
“common denominator” unifying environmental law is the concept of
ecological injury, which in turn implicates certain “recurring features” of
the factual context of environmental law.189 Lazarus identifies six such
features: (1) “Irreversible, Catastrophic, and Continuing Injury”; (2)
“Physically Distant Injury”; (3) “Temporally Distant Injury”; (4)
“Uncertainty and Risk”; (5) “Multiple Causes”; and (6) “Noneconomic,
Nonhuman Character.”190 These features of ecological injury, in turn, result
in environmental laws that exhibit the “dominant characteristics” of
“complexity, scientific uncertainty, dynamism, precaution, and
controversy.”191 And Holly Doremus has identified “four distinctive
features [of environmental problems] that make them especially
intractable”: (1) “high levels of uncertainty”; (2) “conflicts between
socially contested yet strongly held values”; (3) the necessity of collective
action; and (4) the necessity of durable yet flexible solutions.192
The characteristics Lazarus and Doremus describe are important and
recurring characteristics in environmental law. But I would argue that the
core characteristics I have identified—physical public resources and
pervasive interrelatedness—are in the nature of independent, primary
features, from which Lazarus’s and Doremus’s characteristics derive.
Accordingly, Lazarus’s and Doremus’s characteristics overlap considerably
with what I am calling secondary characteristics of environmental law.
Thus, for example, although Lazarus and Doremus are undoubtedly correct
that uncertainty is prevalent in environmental policymaking, uncertainty is
not distinctive to the environment, but rather pervasive in many facets of
life and therefore many legal fields.193 Moreover, the uncertainty in
environmental decisionmaking is largely attributable to the pervasive

Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2420
(1995); Richard J. Lazarus, Survey Says: Court Doesn't Get It, 17 ENVTL. F. 44, 45 (2000);
Lazarus, supra note 173, at 747.
189
Lazarus, supra note 173, at 745.
190
Id. at 745-48.
191
LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 16.
192
Doremus, supra note 185, at 318-19.
193
See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the
Holdup Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (“The problem of uncertainty is
pervasive in all contract negotiations.”); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under
Risk-Based Rules, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1262 (2008) (“[R]elational tax planning is
surrounded by pervasive uncertainty.”).
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interrelationships that comprise ecological systems.194 For my purpose of
understanding environmental law as a distinctive legal field, therefore, it is
better to focus on the core characteristic that gives rise to the uncertainty
that Lazarus and Doremus note.195
D. Policy Tradeoffs
The factual context in which environmental law operates—physical
public resources subject to numerous uses connected by an intricate web of
pervasive interrelationships—creates certain key policy tradeoffs that frame
lawmaking choices. To date, the dominant paradigm has framed these
tradeoffs as pitting economic welfare against environmental protection.
The economy-environment tradeoff can be a powerful lens. It accounts for
much of the politics of environmental lawmaking, in which environmental
groups (representing “the environment”) pursue regulation and the
regulated community (representing “the economy”) fights it. Moreover,
there is certainly some factual truth to the economy-environment tradeoff;
many environmental laws are quite costly.196 For these reasons and others,
it sometimes will be appropriate and helpful to cast the principal tradeoff in
environmental lawmaking as economics versus environment.
The
economics-environment
tradeoff
is,
however,
an
oversimplifying generalization.
The realities of the environmental
decisionmaking context are more complicated and more nuanced than
economics versus environment indicates, and therefore looking at
environmental decisionmaking solely or principally through the lens of the
economy-environment tradeoff obscures important insights into
environmental lawmaking. The principal problem with the economyenvironment tradeoff is that economic interests and environmental
protection are not as monolithic, nor as oppositional, as the tradeoff
suggests.
First, environmental protection itself provides numerous economic
benefits. Cleaner air is associated with various benefits with economic
value, such as reduced health care costs for treating respiratory difficulties.
The decision whether to allow additional air pollution therefore poses a
194

See LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 19 (tracing scientific uncertainty in environmental
lawmaking to “the elaborate intricacies of the workings of the natural environment”).
195
Lazarus and Doremus compiled their lists for purposes other than defining
environmental law as a distinctive legal field, and the differences between our lists may be
attributable to our differing purposes rather than to any disagreement.
196
See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990 at ES-2
(1997) (reporting that the direct costs of implementing the Clean Air Act from 1970 to
1990 totaled $523 billion).
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tradeoff not just between economic benefits and environmental benefits, but
also between conflicting economic benefits: the benefits from using the air
as a waste sink and the benefits of reduced health care costs from cleaner
air. Conflicting economic benefits also arise from temporal tradeoffs, as
using an environmental resource in a particular way at one time may
preclude the same use later. For example, pumping groundwater from an
underground aquifer to use for irrigating farmland may preclude or limit
later use of the aquifer. Thus, in many situations, environmental lawmaking
poses a tradeoff among different economic benefits.
Second, environmental protection also is not as monolithic as the
economy-environment tradeoff suggests. Different uses that we commonly
associate with environmental protection may conflict in a particular
situation. Hiking, camping, and other recreational uses may impair the
quality of plant and wildlife habitat. Ecosystem restoration may require the
elimination or reduction of non-native plants and wildlife. Filtering out
pollutants from wastewater or air emissions may generate solid wastes.
Regulating industrial activity more stringently in California may induce
new industrial activity in other states.
Thus, in many situations,
environmental lawmaking poses a tradeoff among different environmental
benefits.
These economic-economic tradeoffs and environment-environment
tradeoffs are as important to understanding the problems that arise in
environmental law as the economic-environment tradeoff. Thus, as a frame
for analyzing environmental lawmaking, the economics-environment
tradeoff overgeneralizes and oversimplifies to an extent that limits its
explanatory power. Thinking about environmental law in terms of economy
versus environment may simplify the issues, but it does so without enough
benefit. It does not, for example, illuminate any clear patterns in
environmental law doctrine.197
Rather than replacing the economy-environment tradeoff with
another oversimplified generalization with similar shortcomings, consider
the policy tradeoffs in environmental lawmaking more contextually.
Thinking in terms of the various competing uses that can be made of
environmental resources provides a promising analytical framework for
studying environmental lawmaking. The available options to manage an
197

See J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in
Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 523 (2000) (characterizing
environmental lawmaking as a “war of annihilation” between “two extreme and opposing
philosophies--one devoted to protecting the economy and the other to protecting the
environment . . . that has left in its wake the mish-mash of laws, regulations, judicial
opinions, and countless administrative decisions and policies that . . . has no agenda, no
theme, no way of thinking” and “lacks any coherent philosophy”).
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environmental resource can be determined by arranging all possible
combinations of nonconflicting uses. Each scenario, or combination of
nonconflicting uses, is associated with a set of benefits that derive from
those uses. The differences among the different scenarios represent the
tradeoffs posed by environmental lawmaking. Thinking thusly in terms of
use conflicts provides a coherent analytical framework for understanding
environmental lawmaking.
The idea of use conflicts is, of course, neither original to the Article
nor unique to the environmental context. Disputes over natural resources
often are characterized in terms of use conflicts.198 And it was almost fifty
years ago that Coase advocated what is essentially a use-conflict framework
for a variety of land-use problems, including but not limited to
environmental disputes.199 Generally, however, prior references to use
conflicts, even in the environmental context, have not linked them to the
distinctive characteristics of the environmental context: physical public
resources with pervasive interrelatedness. In addition, prior references to
use conflicts in environmental or natural resource law and policy generally
have not extended the term to the full spectrum of benefits derived from
environmental resources. Appreciation of an environmental resource may
not always involve an active or consumptive use of the resource, but it is a
use nonetheless.200 Moreover, it is a use that includes a crucial physical
component, in that appreciation of the environmental resource depends to a
significant extent on the physical condition of the resource.
Conceptualizing environmental law with an organizational
framework that focuses on use conflicts carries several advantages over
alternative frameworks. First, thinking of environmental lawmaking in
terms of use conflicts helpfully highlights the fundamental difficulties of the
198

See, e.g., McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing dispute
over use of snowmobile on route within Yellowstone National Park as presenting problem
of “use conflicts”); Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713,
719 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 16001687, “directs the [Forest] Service to manage conflicting uses of forest resources”) (citing
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)); Mark O. Hatfield, The Nation Needs a Comprehensive Water
Policy, 22 ENVTL. L. 792, 793 (1992) ( “Throughout this country, we are faced within
increasing conflicts over the use of our natural resources.”)
199
See Coase, supra note 163, at 2 (suggesting approaching the problem of contamination
of a stream as a question whether to use the stream for fish habitat or as a waste sink)
(citing GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 105 (1952)); see also Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1000 (2004)
(“To Coase, the economic problem of externalities was essentially one of conflicting
resource use.”)..
200
Cf. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C.Cir.1989)
(“Option and existence values may represent ‘passive’ use, but they nonetheless reflect
utility derived by humans from a resource . . . .”).
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environmental context. For example, environmental lawmaking requires
lawmaking institutions to resolve tradeoffs among conflicting uses, but the
immense complexity of the interrelationships in the environment renders
our understanding of the environment incomplete and makes the precise
nature of those tradeoffs difficult to ascertain. Moreover, the pervasive
interrelationships of the environment prevent lawmaking institutions from
simplifying their decisionmaking by narrowing their focus.
Second, unlike many frameworks that have been proposed for
thinking about environmental law,201 a use-conflict framework does not
assume any particular baseline by which to judge alternative legal
arrangements. Nor does a use-conflict framework favor any particular use
of the environment as normatively superior. Instead, a use-conflict
framework provides a relatively value-neutral approach that facilitates a full
comparison of alternatives. As suits its objective as a descriptive
framework, it does not favor any particular alternative, but rather provides a
useful basis for evaluating alternatives by applying a normative framework,
or even for evaluating alternative normative frameworks. For example, a
proponent of a social utility-maximization normative framework would
favor choosing the legal rule associated with “the set of uses that maximizes
the overall value of all resources.”202
E. Values and Interests
Tradeoffs are only part of lawmaking; equally important are the
values and interests that lawmaking institutions bring to bear on the relevant
tradeoffs in order to make decisions that produce law. As with the
economy-environment tradeoff, we could frame our description of the
values and interests in environmental lawmaking in terms of abstract
generalizations: environmental protection, distributional equity, equity,
economic growth, freedom from regulation, and so forth. But a descriptive
analysis framed with abstract, generalized values and interests suffers from
the same problems as the oversimplified generalization of the economyenvironment tradeoff. We are unlikely to learn much about how
environmental lawmaking functions by trying to discern whether
lawmaking institutions value environmental protection in the abstract, or
even whether lawmaking institutions value environmental protection
comparatively more or less than some other abstract value, such as
economic well-being. To the contrary, our descriptive analysis of the
201

See, e.g., supra Part II.A.3 (criticizing Dan Tarlock’s and David Westbrook’s proposed
frameworks on this ground).
202
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 1000 (2004).
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values and interests in environmental lawmaking becomes insightful when
values and interests are framed specifically enough to tie them to specific
uses of environmental resources. For example, trying to determine whether
the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) values sustainable
fisheries in the abstract is unlikely to yield much concrete insight into the
functioning of fisheries regulation. But determining whether NMFS closes
a fishery when necessary to preserve its long-term viability, over the
objections of the fishing industry, provides useful information about the
relevant values and interests, thereby helping us understand environmental
lawmaking in a meaningful way. Similarly, trying to determine whether the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Clean Air Act are efficient in the abstract is not as useful to
understanding environmental lawmaking as evaluating the relative
efficiency of policy options before EPA and determining why the agency
sometimes chooses a less-efficient option. Thus, as with tradeoffs, the
values and interests associated with environmental lawmaking are best
analyzed descriptively in reference to the potential uses of environmental
resources, and the conflicts among those uses in particular.
F. Legal Doctrine
As the Introduction noted, commenters have bemoaned the
incoherence of environmental law as a body of legal doctrine.203 There do
not appear to be any fundamental, unifying substantive principles that
explain all of environmental law, and I will not propose any. Rather, I want
to make two interrelated points about the incoherence of environmental law
doctrine. First, the incoherence of environmental law provides fertile
material for investigation and analysis.204 We have much to learn from
environmental law’s incoherence, and incoherence can play a constructive
role in the development of environmental law. Second, although the
substance of environmental law doctrine cannot be reduced to a few
fundamental principles, this does not mean that environmental law lacks a
conceptual core. Organizational frameworks such as the one proposed in
this Article, which focus on patterns in dimensions of environmental law
other than legal doctrine, can provide a coherent understanding of
environmental lawmaking.
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As to the benefits of environmental law’s incoherence: There is a
strong ad hoc, muddling-through character to environmental lawmaking as
it has proceeded to date in this country. In part, this may reflect an
instability in values—a lack of societal consensus about how to manage our
relationship with the natural environment.205 But the incoherence of
environmental law runs deeper than an instability of values. The
incoherence reflects the ongoing struggles of environmental law;
incoherence is a functional and productive reaction to the extreme
difficulties environmental law confronts. The factual characteristics of the
environment—physical public resources subject to numerous, pervasively
interrelated uses—give environmental problems a scale and complexity that
severely taxes, and may even surpass, the abilities of human understanding.
In the environmental lawmaking context, uncertainty is endemic.
Lawmaking institutions respond to these challenges with an ad hoc mix of
policies, struggling to find something that works.
Pragmatic
experimentation necessarily produces incoherence.
Moreover, some of what we perceive as incoherence in
environmental law doctrine is actually variation, whether intentional or
unintentional. Different use conflicts create different tradeoffs and yield
different environmental laws. Regulatory approaches evolve over time as
lawmaking institutions’ understanding of environmental problems, and of
the effects of environmental policies, change. When a policy approach does
not function as intended, new approaches are tried. There is no strong force
pushing lawmaking institutions toward coherence in their approach to
environmental problems, and, in light of the benefits of variation, it is not
clear that this is such a bad thing.
One understandably could ask whether, in the face of this
incoherence (and variation), there is enough to hold environmental law
together as a field. I believe the answer is yes. An analytical framework
like the one set forth in this Article can cohere environmental lawmaking
conceptually, even if it does not and cannot distill environmental law into
coherent doctrine. In this Article we have identified patterns along other
dimensions of environmental law—in factual context, policy tradeoffs, and
values and interests—that together provide a useful framework for
analyzing and understanding the process of environmental lawmaking. The
relationship among these patterns can be represented with a conceptual
diagram of environmental law, just as we earlier represented a conceptual
diagram of a generic legal field:

205

Tarlock, supra note 10, at 223.

58

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD

Figure 2: Conceptual Diagram of Environmental Law
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Environmental problems share this conceptual pattern, but the
substance of environmental problems—the specific tradeoffs and values at
issue, and the legal doctrine that results from the application of those values
and interests to those tradeoffs through lawmaking processes—depends
heavily on specifics of context that vary from situation to situation and defy
generalization.
G. Transcendence
Can environmental law answer Judge Easterbrook’s challenge to
cyberlaw,206 to which Lawrence Lessig responded in his Harvard Law
Review article,207 by yielding any distinctive yet transcendent insights?
That is to say, does environmental law illuminate any “lessons for law
generally”?208 I believe it does, and in particular that the idea of pervasive
interrelatedness, which is so important to environmental law’s task of
managing the natural environment, is a concept that has important and farreaching implications for the law generally as well.
We have seen that pervasive interrelatedness is a fundamental
characteristic of the environmental context, absolutely crucial to
understanding environmental problems.209 Pervasive interrelatedness is
distinctive to environmental law, but also transcendent, with implications
throughout the law in ways that already are being recognized.
Pervasive interrelatedness is distinctive but not unique to
environmental law. Environmental law is inherently closely linked to
ecology, the science of the environment, by virtue of their mutual focus on
the environment. Because ecology forms the basis for our understanding of
the environment, environmental law must incorporate ecology’s insights if
it has any hope of functioning as intended, regardless what that intent is.
Accordingly, because pervasive interrelatedness is such a central feature of
206
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the environment and a core precept of ecology, environmental law
constantly faces the task of regulating in a context of pervasive
interrelatedness.
Environmental law both responds to pervasive
interrelatedness and works through pervasively interrelated mechanisms.
Pervasive interrelationships are unavoidable in environmental law, and
environmental law grapples with pervasive interrelatedness to a greater
extent than other areas of law. Indeed, western law has exhibited a strong
tradition of attempting to limit the scope of the interrelationships it
considers—for example, by limiting liability through the application of
proximate cause—and environmental law can be seen in some respects as
challenging that tradition and the assumption that the law can function
effectively without considering a broader range of interrelationships.210
Pervasive interrelatedness of the natural environment is distinctive
to environmental law, but pervasive interrelatedness more generally is not
unique to the natural environment. The experiences from environmental
law’s application in the pervasively interrelated context of the natural
environment have important lessons for the application of law in other
contexts where interrelatedness is present but not as obvious. For example,
some of the theories and management techniques that environmental law
and ecology have employed to deal with pervasive interrelatedness, such as
adaptive management, complexity theory, and chaos theory,211 also show
significant promise for application outside of environmental law.212 More
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generally, the concept of pervasive interrelatedness highlights how dividing
the law into insular sub-fields obscures important interrelationships among
different areas of the law and supports an agenda of aggressively pursuing
integration of legal doctrine and theory across legal fields.
CONCLUSION
Environmental law cannot be reduced to a set of fundamental
unifying legal principles.
Rather, the dominant characteristic of
environmental lawmaking has been ad hoc muddling through, and this is
reflected in the complexity and diversity of environmental law doctrine.
But this apparent doctrinal incoherence does not mean that environmental
law lacks a conceptual core or that it is not a legal field. An area of law is a
legal field if it exhibits patterns associated with common and distinctive
features that predominate within the area to an extent that justifies studying
the area as a distinct category of legal situations. We can cohere an area of
law into a field by employing an organizational framework to highlight the
distinctive patterns associated with the field.
Applying this methodology to environmental law, environmental
law as a legal field is best understood conceptually as a category of
situations that involve physical public resources subject to numerous,
pervasively interrelated uses. Conflicts among these uses are inevitable,
and create tradeoffs. These use-conflict tradeoffs define the choices facing
environmental lawmaking institutions.
This use-conflict framework for environmental law is superior to
other explanations of environmental law because it focuses on features that
are common and distinctive to environmental law and that explain the
fundamental difficulties of lawmaking in the environmental context. It does
so, moreover, with a relatively value-neutral approach. Unlike explanations
of environmental law that are tethered to environmentalism, market
capitalism, or other ideological commitments, the use-conflict framework
does not assume any particular baseline by which to judge alternative
options and does not favor any particular use of the environment as
normatively superior. By thus adopting a relatively value-neutral approach,
the use-conflict framework facilitates critical analysis of a full range of
alternatives.

English-style corporate takeover law as an application of chaos and path dependence
theory).

